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Small business is a sacred cow in America. In 1958, Congress created
the Small Business Investment Company ("SBIC"), a unique public-private
program that provides long-term capital to small business enterprises. From
its inception, however, the SBIC has been plagued by inefficiency and
failure. Yet, Congress continues to pour millions of dollars into the SBIC
program, with no end in sight. What explains this failed policy course?
This article argues that many small business programs today are locked
in due to heavy investment by our legal system that outweighs any
advantages from possible change. Over the years, path dependency through
increasing returns of small business preferences occurred as the benefits of
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this choice augmented simply because over time more people opted for that
choice.
The SBIC program is one example of the pitfalls of legal and political
institutional path dependency of small business preferences and should be
replaced by private institutional lending system. Pursuant to this account,
our romantic ideal of small business as an economic and social catalyst has
sprouted positive cultural feedbacks. Thereafter, Political small business
institutions such as the House and Senate Small Business Committees and
the Small Business Administration sustained this culture, self-reinforcing
inefficient paths of small business favoritism where we remain invested to
this day.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Under current definitions 97% percent of all corporations are small.'
When the recent economic recession struck, the acute impact of the credit
freeze on small businesses became a political rallying cry.2 Senator Mary L.
Landrieu (D-LA) declared that "[s]mall business in America needs a
champion in Washington right now," while Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA)
demanded to know "[w]hen are we going to stand up for small businesses in
America who have had trouble getting access to ... capital, who have been
penalized?' 3 To bridge the equity gap, namely the disparity between long-
term finance demand and the supply of loans or equity-type credit, 4 Congress
1. Between 1944 and 2007, 97% or more of all corporation returns were of those with
assets of $5 million or less. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK OF
STATISTICS OF INCOME (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats
/article/0,,id=l 12834,00.html. Defining a "small business" has long been considered "a
daunting task that requires capturing a moving target." OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL
Bus. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY FOR DATA YEAR 2006: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 9 (2007), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sb_ econ2007.pdf. The
Small Business Act of 1958 crudely defines a small business as an enterprise that is
"independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation." Pub.
L. No. 85-536, § 3, 72 Stat. 384, 384 (1958) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 632(1) (1998)). But the
modern approach more specifically examines the number of employees or average annual
receipts. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Summary of Size Standards by
Industry, SBA.Gov, http://www.sba.gov/content/summary-size-standards-industry (last visited
April 13, 2012) (defining small manufacturing and mining enterprises as having five hundred
or fewer employees); Small Business Size Regulations, 13 C.F.R. § 121-201 (2011)
(providing for size eligibility provisions and standards for small business in each industry).
See also Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics,
and The History of Organizational Choice in the 1950s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 6 (2008)
(examining history of the "small business" definition).
2. See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, With Bank Credit Frozen, Small U.S. Businesses Starting to
Turn to Microlenders, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2010, at A09.
3. Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship,
LeMieux, Landrieu, Senate Democrats Fight to Include Credit Relief for Small Businesses
(Jul. 22, 2010) (on file with author) (statement of Sen. George LeMieux (R-FL)) ("One of the
biggest hurdles is the ability for [small] businesses to secure loans or investors."); 150 CONG.
REC. H2921, 2968 (daily ed. May 13, 2004) (statement of Rep. John Tierney (D-MA)) ("As a
person in a small business and representing a number of small businesses for over 22 years, I
can tell you small business employers do not want an inferior policy for their employees.").
4. The equity gap is especially acute for small business managers because they are
often denied credit due to the fact that they do not have enough equity base, collaterals or
"hard assets." This is especially true for small business in the services industry (such as
software companies), which do not have an equity base wide enough to secure loans and
credit. For a general description of the equity gap see ERIC N.WEIss, GOV'T & FIN. DIVISION,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: ECONOMIC FACTORS AFFECTING SMALL BUSINESS LENDING AND
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enacted a set of economic stimulus initiatives that introduced larger tax
breaks for small businesses, increased the lending authority of the Small
Business Administration ("SBA"), and spurred lending through the Small
Business Investment Company ("SBIC") program.
5
Distilled to their essence, the recent initiatives to help small businesses
are just old wine in new bottles. They were a continuation of a pattern
established decades earlier. Just before the onset of the Great Depression,
President Calvin Coolidge proclaimed that "[t]he chief business of the
American people is business."6 That mantra eventually was appropriated by
small business. The creation of the SBIC program in 1958 was intended to
stimulate economic activity by creating jobs and assisting in the national
economic recovery. But what originally was meant to be a remedy
inadvertently set into motion a path of waste that Congress has sustained
now for over half a century. The fault, however, does not lie exclusively with
politicians. They have been locked into this position because society has
become enamored with the idea of small business. That romantic ideal has
taken root within a myriad of legal organizations, and can no longer be easily
undone.
Most notable, the SBIC, through which the SBA has channeled some
small business funding, epitomizes how public-sector initiatives can fail
within the private sector. For decades, the SBA has licensed the use of
partnerships, LLCs, and corporations to make long-term loans and equity
participation to small businesses.7 These SBICs have been propped up even
LOAN GUARANTEES 1, 7 (2008) (reviewing demand and supply for business loans, and the
impact of economic slowdown on small business lending and loan guarantees).
5. For an explanation on the SBIC see infra note 7 and accompanying text. See also
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009)
(establishing tax incentives for businesses and SBICs); State of the Small Business Economy
and Identifying Policies To Promote Economic Recovery: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Small Business, 111 th Cong. 85 (2009) (examining the status of small businesses financial
situation, and proposing federal policies to promote small business development and
economic growth).
6. President Calvin Coolidge, Address Before the American Society of Newspaper
Editors (Jan. 17, 1925), in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 614 (Justin Kaplan ed.,
16th ed. 1992).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 681 (2010) ("A small business investment company shall be an
incorporated body, a limited liability company, or a limited partnership organized and
chartered or otherwise existing under State law solely for the purpose of performing the
functions and conducting the activities contemplated under this subchapter... [and] subject to
the approval of the Administration.").
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further by federally guaranteed loans, 8 as well as a myriad of preferential
treatment and concessions from the government, 9 all for the express purpose
of encouraging investment in small business. Indeed, this expansive and
sustained commitment by the government to the SBIC program has earned it
the moniker of a "fourth banking system."'
And, by most accounts, this system is entirely broken. " Studies of the
SBIC program have found it has generated limited profits and incurred
considerable losses to the federal government, 2 thereby failing to provide
8. These loans can amount up to half of an SBIC's paid-in capital. See, e.g., Small
Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 633 (1958) ("The Small Business Investment
Act of 1958").
9. One of the preferential tax treatments the government grants investors in SBICs
includes full deductibility of dividends from SBICs by the receiving corporation. 26 U.S.C. §
243 (2009). Losses up to $100,000 from sale of stock of an SBIC are treated as ordinary
losses, and thus deductible against ordinary income, which is taxed at higher tax rates. Special
non-recognition gain rules also permit investors to roll over publicly traded stock gains into
SBICs without paying capital gain taxes. See id §§ 1242, 1044. Moreover, other government
agencies have eased the regulatory burden on SBICs and provided them with more flexible
rules. See, e.g., Allan F. Conwill, Protection or Oppression? The Investment Company Act
Impact on the Publicly Held SBIC, SEC.GOV (Oct. 3, 1963), http://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/] 963/100363conwill.pdf.
10. ADDISON W. PARRIS, THE SMALL BuSINEss ADMINISTRATION 150 (1968) (describing
the SBIC as an addition to the existing "three traditional financial institutions in the United
States-the commercial banks, savings institutions, and investment banks.").
11. The SBIC program received little attention from legal scholars, who mostly
criticized its persistence. See, e.g., Jess H. Darrin, Minority Enterprise Development and the
Small Business Administration's Section 8(a) Program: Constitutional Basis and Regulatory
Implementation, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 433, 472-73 (1983); Joseph W. Bartlett, Government-
Enhanced Equity Available for Investment in Traditional Venture Capital and Buyouts: The
New SBIC Participating Securities Program, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 589, 612-15 (1994)
(arguing that the SBA's SBIC participating securities program is inadequate to handle small
business financing); John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains
Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REV. 1, 16 (1995) (criticizing the contention behind granting
investors in SBICs tax preferences such as the one found in section 1044); Dr. Jeffrey
Robinson, Current Issues in Community Economic Development: Urban Entrepreneurship:
Patterns and Policy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 103, 110-11 (2007) (generally stating that
federal programs have used a capital access-driven strategy to address business development);
Brian Krumm, Understanding the New Tennessee Small Business Investment Company Credit
Act: Stimulating Economic Growth at the Intersection of Free Market Capitalism and
Government Intervention, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 93, 93-95 (2010) (Providing
background for the new Tennessee Small Business Investment Company Credit Act and
reviewing the possible problems associated with the act's emphasis on seed and early stage
financing).
12. See, e.g., Elijah Brewer III et al., A Trojan Horse or the Golden Fleece? Small
Business Investment Companies and Government Guarantees I (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chicago Working Paper Grp., Paper No. WP-97-22, 1997), available at
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
sufficient capital to spur significant assistance to small business. 13 Further,
the program conducts minimal review of its loan recipients, and involves
bureaucracy on an order that deters many venture capitalists. 14 And the
various exemptions and tax concessions granted to SBICs contribute to the
increasing complexity of the legal system and compound the already
elevated compliance costs of small business entities. 15
But the program's survival, much less its problems, is a historical
accident. When the SBIC program was introduced in 1958, it was chosen
from a set of alternatives to support small business available at that time.16
Since that path was chosen, Congress repeatedly renewed the program in all
of its inefficient infamy. And each and every subsequent session of Congress
has expanded the SBIC program, adding to the monolithic waste that persists
to this day.
One explanation for the program's persistence may simply be politics.
17
Pursuant to public choice theory, politicians arguably have been beholden to
the interests of their constituents,18 many of whom own, operate, or work for
a small business; and, indeed, there is some historical evidence to this
effect. 19 Further, the exalted status of small business as a bedrock of America
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital assets/publications/workingpapers/1997/wp97_22.pdf.
(reviewing the state of the small business investment company program).
13. See, e.g., Steven L. Brooks, The Venture Capital Investment Act of 2001:
Arkansas 's Vision for Economic Growth, 56 ARK. L. REV. 397, 402 (2003) (reviewing venture
capital under Arkansas law as an attempt to stimulate economic growth).
14. See, e.g., JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO
BOOST ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED - AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT
IT 38-39 (2009) (detailing the inherent problems with the SBIC program today).
15. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory Exemptions, 72 UMKC L.
REV. 857, 863 (2004) (exploring the costs associated with small business regulatory
exemptions); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current
Developments And Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225, 233-35 (1979) (discussing the cost
to the government of the forgone revenue associated with tax preferences).
16. See, e.g., H.R. 10345, 85th Cong. (1958) (proposal by John Wright Patman (D-TX)
to form a small business capital banks system).
17. Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The Political Influence of American Small
Business, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 15, 28 (1996) (discussing the influence of small business
organizations).
18. Philip Shabecoff, S.B.A. Under Fire: Program To Assist Minorities Discounted,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1971, at F3; Irwin L. Kellner, A Bright Forecast for Small Businesses,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1984, at L120 (avowing to the notion that the business of our country is
small business).
19. See, e.g., Eyal-Cohen, supra note 1, at 17, 21 (demonstrating how lobbying efforts
and rhetoric were some of the factors that influenced the creation of the Small Business
Corporation in 1958).
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perhaps insulates the SBIC program; no politician wants to be seen attacking
"Main Streets across America" 20 and taking money away from small
businesses that are regarded popularly as "the engine of job creation in this
country.'
Politics, however, cannot entirely explain the complex history of the
SBIC program. That program is one of many divisions of the SBA, which
22has seen its lending authority constricted in numerous ways over the years.
In contrast, the SBIC program has remained largely intact and even
expanded in the name of a myriad of social purposes. The missing piece of
this puzzle lies in path dependence theory.24
This article examines through the prism of social history the legal and
political institutional path dependency of small business favoritism. Part II of
this article provides a general account of the path dependence theory as
applied in a political realm. Part III demonstrates how our romantic ideal of
small business has sprouted positive cultural feedback. That positive
feedback portrayed our belief in democratic free-enterprise society and small
20. Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship,
supra note 3 (statement of Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA)).
21. Id. (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)). But see Alex Labeau, Op-Ed.,
IACI: Beware Politicians Who Tout Small Biz, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, July 19, 2010, at 1
("In reality, the real cynical political motivation for touting 'small business' is to create an 'us
versus them' mentality that is not only a misrepresentation of reality, but a dangerous path of
rhetoric that leads to an economic caste system."). See generally Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Should
Small Businesses Be Tax-Favored? 48 NAT'L TAX J. 387, 387 (1995) (asserting that
constructing a case of systematic favoritism of small businesses is quite difficult, especially
through the tax code); see also Wilson, supra note 17, at 68 (estimating the cost of annually
subsidizing small business to be $5 billion); see also infra Part Ill.
22. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IIL.B (proposals to limit and even abolish the SBA in
Reagan's administration).
23. See infra Part Ill. But see, infra note 278, The SBIC Participating Securities
Program has been cancelled in 2004 and there have been recent proposals to reinstate this
program due to increased need of supply of venture capital investments to small business. See,
e.g. H.R. 5297, the Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2010, which would have authorized
a $1 billion Small Business Early-Stage Investment Program. 156 Cong. Rec. Daily H4608,
H4609 (June 17, 2010).
24. See, e.g., Lucian Aye Bacchus & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127, 127 (1999) (applying path
dependence theory to initial choices by business ownership structures); Oona A. Hathaway,
Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law
System, 86 IowA L. REv. 601, 604 (2001) (arguing that stare decisis is a path dependent legal
doctrine); Paul Pierson & Theca Scope, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political
Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 693, 693-721 (Ira Katz Nelson &
Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (describing the role of institutions in preserving historical
structures).
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
business as a means to stimulate economic activity and social change. Part
IV delineates how that feedback has been self-reinforced by small business
congressional committees and the SBA, which ultimately cultivated the
creation of the SBIC program. Part V establishes how the feedback and
reinforcement have resulted in lock-in despite empirical evidence of dismal
results by the SBIC program from its inception to the present. Our legal
system remains heavily invested in an unsuccessful path, believing the costs
of change outweigh any advantages from possible change. Finally, Part VI
concludes that the time is ripe to break the SBIC path dependency through
radical reform and to return to the initial proposal to finance small business
through private local banks.
II. PATH DEPENDENCE As REFLECTED IN A POLITY
Past decisions can affect our decisions today, even if society has changed
significantly and those past circumstances may no longer be relevant.25
When certain conditions are present, an inefficient policy path can become
locked-in, with the cost of switching to a superior alternative becoming
prohibitively high.26 Economist Paul David identified four common
conditions that may contribute to path dependency in an economy that faces
different technological choices: increasing returns, self-reinforcement,
positive feedback, and lock-in.27 Increasing returns means the more a choice
is made, the greater its benefits due to the fact that more people opt to make
this particular choice.28 Self-reinforcement describes a condition where once
25. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332-
37 (1985).
26. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 641, 645-46 (1996) (arguing that the possibility of breaking out of a lock-in situation lies
in the overall efficiency and strength of the pattern created in the past); Daryl Lim, Copyright
Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Compulsory
Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 481, 508 (2007) ("Consumers
become 'locked in' to the product because of switching costs associated with moving from
one network to another."); see also Maximo Kanger, The Rise of Managerial Judging in
International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 909 n.369 (2005) (same).
27. David, supra note 25, at 332.
28. Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000). For example, the more a contract term is used by firms,
the greater the benefit from the common use of standard terms. Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior
and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347, 348 (1996). Another example is the Polya Urn.
In this experiment, there is a large urn containing two balls, one black, and one red. Each time,
one ball is removed, and then returned to the urn, accompanied by an additional ball of the
[Vol. 43:1
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a choice has been made, it creates complementary institutions that maintain
this choice. 29 Next, positive feedback processes are positive externalities
created when the same choice is made by other people, i.e., there exists a
benefit to people from having their choice be the prevailing one.30 Finally,
the lock-in effect describes a circumstance by which an inefficient choice is
repeated because a sufficient number of people have become invested in that
choice.31 While the path dependence theory stresses that the future path
depends largely on past choices, it also acknowledges that sudden shocks can
alter the course of history. 32
same color. This process is repeated until the urn is full. This experiment demonstrates that
early draws in each trial, although random, will have an increasing effect on the final result.
See generally Greg Hill, History, Necessity, and Rational Choice Theory, 9 RATIONALITY &
Soc'Y 189, 198-200 (1997).
29. For instance, states establish institutions in order to coordinate their actions through
telecommunication institutions. Because development of those institutions is both time-
consuming and resource intensive, states will be less inclined to deviate from current
structures for risk of losing their existing investment. William J. Aceves, Institutionalist
Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 246 (1997)
(citing Wayne Sandholtz, Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in
Western Europe, 45 WORLD POL. 242 (1993)) (discussing the role of institutions in
technological and market changes).
30. For example, the more consumers use a certain software, the more applications are
written to accompany this software and improve the software's features, which attracts more
users to purchase this software. Marina Lao, Reclaiming A Role For Intent Evidence In
Monopolization Analysis, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 182 (2004) (describing positive feedbacks
created when more users use Windows software).
31. Building on the software example in supra note 30, because consumers face high
switching costs in changing to another software, they become "locked in" and dependent on
the initial software. Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the
Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB.
L.J. Sci. & TECH. 481, 508 (2007); see generally Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, I Q. J. oF
POL. Sci. 87, 88 (2006) (identifying the processes of obtaining music performance rights for
theatrical motion pictures as examples of path dependent historical processes). According to
path dependence scholars, the possibility of breaking out of a lock-in situation lays in the
overall efficiency and strength of the pattern created in the past. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 645-46 (1996); Maximo Kanger,
The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 908
n.369 (2005).
32. Douglas J. Puffert, Path Dependence, Network Form, and Technological Change, in
HISTORY MATTERS: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH, TECHNOLOGY, AND POPULATION 63, 63
(Timothy W. Guinnane, William A. Sundstrom, Warren C. Whatley eds., 2004) ("A process
of economic allocation is called path dependent when the sequence of allocations depends not
only on fundamental, a priori determinants-typically listed as technology, factor
endowments, preferences, and institutions-but also on particular contingent events.").
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
When applying these common conditions of path dependency to
politics, 33 political scientist Paul Pierson noted that four aspects of the
political realm reinforce increasing returns processes: (1) the central role of
political collective action; that is, the effectiveness of one's political action,
depends heavily on the actions of others and requires positive feedback to
provide confidence that a large number of other people will do the same; (2)
the high density of institutions encourages social actors to make
commitments causing their cost of exit from established arrangements to rise
dramatically; (3) power asymmetry in politics allows certain actors that are
in a position to impose rules on others to make open political conflict
unnecessary; and (4) the fact that the political system is usually complex and
murky induces increasing returns in an attempt to make social interpretations
of the current political system.
34
Pierson concludes that path dependence in politics puts organizations in
the center and says "despite massive social, economic, and political changes
over time, self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action
processes mean that organizations have a strong tendency to persist once
they are institutionalized. 35 Explicitly, political institutions have a great
influence in reinforcing path dependence in our society by sustaining
dynamics of "increasing returns" through "self-reinforcement" and "positive
36
feedback" processes in a political system.
Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass North emphasized the role of
path dependence in explaining patterns of institutional emergence,
33. One example of increasing returns dynamics in a polity is the persistence of
government structures of ancient European settlements. In remote and unattractive areas,
colonists tended to create colonies lacking strong property protections and safeguards against
government expropriation, while in areas with more welcoming climates, Europeans were
more inclined to establish colonies with more representative governance structures and trade-
friendly policies. These initial institutional arrangements persisted as those colonies developed
political structures and reinforced their paths. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, & James A.
Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91
AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1373-77, 1395 (2001).
34. Pierson, supra note 28, at 257-62.
35. Id. at 258-59.
36. Id. at 251; Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in
Contemporary Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 693,
699-703 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002). Pierson noted that what economists
call "increasing returns" could generally describe self-reinforcing or positive feedback
processes when analyzed against the distinctive characteristics of social processes. Pierson,
supra note 28, at 251. Pierson also noted "for some theorists, increasing returns are the source
of path dependence, for others, they typify only one form of path dependence." Id.
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persistence, and change.3 7 He asserted it is important to distinguish between
organizations and institutions, because while both provide the structural
framework supporting human discourse, institutions are considered the rules
of the game that contain constraints and enforcement characteristics, whereas
organizations are the players. 38 Organizations usually exercise their influence
to maintain themselves and to stifle upstarts and change.39 This is even more
pronounced when they also serve as agents of certain groups in society, and
thus are not obligated to the general good of all citizens but only to the ones
they represent.4° Once in place, institutions are hard to change, and they have
a tremendous effect on the possibilities for generating sustained economic
growth.4'
Consequently, even if superior choices become available down the road,
the entrenchment of certain institutional arrangements obstructs further
42change or any chance to reverse the initial choice. Moreover, alternatives
37. Douglass C. North, The Historical Evolution of Polities, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
381, 385 (1994); see generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 92-104 (1990) (considering the structure of institutions and
their impact on the organizations that operate according to them).
38. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
supra note 37, at 4-5.
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 100. See, also Pierson, supra note 28, at 259 ("[D]espite massive social,
economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing dynamics associated with
collective action processes mean that organizations have a strong tendency to persist once they
are institutionalized.").
41. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal
Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 246-47 (1997) (observing how legal, market,
and technological changes can be transformed by states into institutions). See also, Douglas J.
Puffert, Path Dependence, Network Form, and Technological Change, in HISTORY MATTERS:
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH, TECHNOLOGY, AND POPULATION 63, 63 (Timothy W.
Guinnane, William A. Sundstrom, Warren C. Whatley eds., 2004) ("A process of economic
allocation is called path dependent when the sequence of allocations depends not only on
fundamental, a priori determinants-typically listed as technology, factor endowments,
preferences, and institutions-but also on particular contingent events.") (emphasis added);
see also RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE (1982) (discussing path dependence and evolutionary economics processes); Scott E.
Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q. J. OF POL. SCI. 87, 88 (2006) (applying path dependency theory
to the process of obtaining music performance rights for theatrical motion pictures). David's
conception of path dependency concerns economic and technological developments, but has
been extended to institutions. See supra note 25.
42. See, e.g., Margaret Levi, A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in
Comparative and Historical Analysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE,
AND STRUCTURE 17, 19-41 (Mark I. Lichgate & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997) (using the
metaphor of a tree where, "from the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
that were once plausible may become inefficient to recover further down the
road. In this way legal and political institutions can interfere with the natural
progress of development and change, and may render an unwelcome path
determined result.
III. POSITIVE SMALL BUSINESS FEEDBACK
Culture influences institutional performance. Yet, culture is a broad term
that includes, but is not limited to, values, ideas, beliefs and other symbolic,
meaningful systems that shape human behavior.43 It affects how we interpret
and process information, how we act, and how we expect others to act.
44
Small business culture originated from Americans' increasingly romantic
and protective feelings about small businesses. Americans have long held
dear general values of freedom and decentralization, and these values are
reflected in the culture's positive feelings toward small businesses. Small
Business enterprises, Americans believe, epitomize individuality and
freedom, and are a counterpoint to large corporations. Although not
necessarily true, small business have been portrayed as entrepreneurs and as
contributing greatly to economic development. 45 This association of small
businesses with fundamental American values reinforced policies favoring
small businesses.
The fundamental importance of small business, grounded in our culture,
supported the persistence of small business programs such as the SBIC.
Small business culture produced a build-up of behavioral routines, social
connections, and cognitive structures that provided "positive feedback" to
the government of the positive externalities small business create in society
branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other-and
essential if the chosen branch dies, the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends
to follow.").
43. Geert Hofstede, Culture and Organizations, 10 INT'L STUD. MGMT. & ORG., 15, 15-
18(1981).
44. See, e.g., Jenna Bednar & Scott E. Page, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN INSTITUTE OF
GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, Culture, Institutional Performance, and Path Dependence, at 1
(2005), http://www.cscs.umich.edu/-spage/instpath.pdf.
45. See, e.g., 133 Cong. Rec. S6599 (Daily ed. May 15, 1987) (Statement of Sen.
Karnes) ("The true entrepreneurial spirit thrives in small business throughout this country...
much of the future of America's economy depends on the ideas of our entrepreneurs in small
business."). But see, Martin A., New Research Weakens Case for Small Business Tax Relief,
134 Tax Notes 54 (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.tax.com/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/Permalink/UBEN-
8Q7JUJ?OpenDocument ("Small businesses are mainly skilled craftspeople... [that] do little
innovation. They provide relatively standardized goods and services for existing customer
bases.")
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that would seemingly disappear if the path were altered. Keepers of free
competition, 46 indicators to a healthy economy,47 and promoters of minorities
and social justice48 were some of the positive feedback attributable to small
concerns. Congressional interest in the small business programs over time
has increased due to that positive feedback that viewed the program as
another means to stimulate economic and social change.49 Mistrust of big
corporations and the belief in free enterprise were other social values
instrumental in reinforcing the path. 50 Along with those dynamics of positive
feedback, small business organizations provided effective reinforcement that
together contributed to the persistence of small business programs.
5
1
Originating from values of freedom and dispersion of power, a set of
beliefs was formed about the benefits small businesses generate. Their
volatile condition in times of economic crises and natural disasters nurtured
the path of small business favoritism. This type of solicitude toward small
52
business at times became a bias, not always justified on its merits. Congress
sought to protect independent small businesses from the power of trusts,
crime, recessions, natural disasters, discrimination, poverty, heavy red tape
and compliance costs. As America weathered internal economic crises,
external natural catastrophes and changes in social status of minorities, these
important events in twentieth century history sustained the path of small
business favoritism.
46. See infra Part III.A.
47. See infra Part IJ.C.
48. See infra Part III.D.
49. See, e.g., Robert Jay Dilger & Oscar R. Gonzales, Small Business Investment
Company Program, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (June 23, 2011), http://www.ndia.org
/Divisions/Divisions/SmallBusiness/Documents/SBA%20Small%2OBusiness%201nvestment
%20Company%20Program.pdf.
50. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small is Not Beautiful: the Case against Special Regulatory
Treatment of Small Firm, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 542 (1998) (noting that the myth that small
is good and big is bad that is deeply rooted in our cultural beliefs is responsible for that
phenomenon).
51. Id.
52. See generally Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-sizing the "Little Guy" Myth in Legal
Definitions, 98 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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A. Small Business as the Epitome of American Liberty
America has a love-hate relationship with big business.5 3 While big
businesses are associated with efficiency in production and are credited with
raising the standard of living, they are feared for the power they possess over
prices, wages and social values.54 On the other hand, the public and small
businesses have had a long, continuous love affair. It started with the writers
of the Constitution creating checks and balances against concentration of
political power. It continued with the widely accepted proposition that one
prerequisite for a good society and a prosperous economy is numerous small
businesses. 55
American culture celebrates liberty and shuns concentrations of power.56
Inherited from British common law, a suspicion of corporate charters was
witnessed by the founding father's view that such special privileges generally
led to monopoly. 57 Similarly, the choice of a federalist system reflected a
mixture of reliance on and mistrust in a centralized authority, and resulted in
a Constitution that created a federal government with checks and balances.58
Until the end of the nineteenth century, small businesses were the
norm-most businesses were modest and had relatively local dealings.
59
They played an important role in developing the nation's economy as
thousands of small firms handled the production and distribution of goods
53. See, e.g., MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 47
(2d ed. 2003) (describing public attitudes and government policies toward small and big
business).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., PARRIS, supra note 10, at vi. ("The fear of centralization has recurred
throughout our history, and there has long been a suspicion among many Americans that
economic power is political power. Hence, there have always been voices inveighing against
interests and championing diffusion .... Sprung from the theories of the Founding Fathers,
this conviction remains a basic American principle.").
56. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[A]II men are
endowed . . . with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness."); see also G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 viii (1969) (discussing the concepts of "liberty," "virtue," and "republicanism" in
that period).
57. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008).
58. "From the start, Americans have regarded their government with a mixture of
reliance and mistrust . . . . 'If men were angels,' observed the 51st Federalist Paper, 'no
government would be necessary."' CHRISTOPHER DWYER, THE SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION (KNOW YOUR GOVERNMENT) 7 (1991) (citing ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR.,THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE: IDEAS, POWER, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1969)).
59. See BLACKFORD, supra note 53, at II ("[T]housands of small, personally owned and
operated firms... formed the glue of America's business system.").
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and services.6° With the advancement of technology that permitted
economies of scale and scope came the "transportation revolution" by which
big firms emerged and began to dominate the production industry,
specifically railroads. 61 Big businesses soon developed into giant trusts by
vertically integrating enterprises to combine mass production with mass
distribution, and controlled all the production and sale stages of their
products. Small firms survived this age of giants by occupying market niches
ignored by big businesses.
Concern for small business remained at the heart of American society.
63
The very nature of the nation's democracy, said Lawrence M. Friedman, is
"small local people, with small, local minds, wield[ing] enormous power
over schools and over municipal politics." 64 The national ethos of the
"American dream" and "the land of endless opportunity" have been
irrevocably entwined with preserving free private enterprise and the need to
guarantee the well-being of small business. 65 Yet, to protect small business
interests, the government had to regulate the market and limit the freedom of
some market actors, sometimes restricting the same economic freedom it
sought to promote. 66 Over the years, antitrust laws and trade regulations were
some of the measures taken to regulate abuses of corporate power. This type
of restrained capitalism has been the subject of much debate and its
boundaries are still being reexamined today.
67
60. Id.
61. TAMIR AGMON & RICHARD DROBNICK, SMALL FIRMS IN GLOBAL COMPETITION 9-10
(1994).
62. BLACKFORD, supra note 53, at 11-14; see also Sanford L. Jacobs, Small Business;
Small Concerns Find a Niche Solving Problems of Big Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1986, at
25 (arguing small concerns find segments of the market big companies are not serving).
63. See, e.g., David Broiles, When Myths Collide: An Analysis of Conflicting U.S.-
Japanese Views on Economics, Law, and Values, I TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 109 (1994)
(comparing the differences between the American and the Japanese conceptions of fair
competition and belief in government intervention in the market economy).
64. Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Comments, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
927, 930 (2004).
65. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 5433 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hamilton (D-[N)) ("[T]he
independent entrepreneur is a central figure in American folklore-an integral part of the
'American Dream'.").
66. For the expansion of federal jurisdiction attributable to protecting business interests
see, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 64-65 (1928).
67. Critics often claim that the government became too involved in business. For a
description of the change in the model of corporate regulation see, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Using
Religion to Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 872 (2004).
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B. Small Business Culture in Light of Endogenous Crises
Over the years, internal predicaments within the market affected
Congress's sense of responsibility to the well-being of small business.
Merger waves, hostile takeovers and other anti-competitive dealings
originating within the market had a large effect on strengthening small
business culture. Although Congress could not prevent anti-competitive
conduct altogether, it felt responsible for the effect that conduct had on small
business. Congress responded by trying to regulate large business while
increasing small business favoritism.68
In the 1800s, monopolies were a key feature of the U.S. economy, which
eventually spurred lawmakers to enact antitrust legislation. In the age of
giant railroads, oil, steel, and sugar trusts, companies such as U.S. Steel and
Standard Oil controlled the supply and prices of products in their industries.
To protect competition in the "movement of commerce," that is, the
transportation industry,69 Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887.70 Three years later, Congress broadened competition policy by passing
the Sherman Act "to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints
and monopolies. 7 1 It also created the Federal Trade Commission as an
independent regulatory agency and empowered it to assist the Justice
Department in enforcing antitrust laws.72 During the Gilded Age, monopolies
and trusts were formed.73 In response, the government enacted antitrust laws
that sought to balance and regulate, yet not destroy, concentrations of
economic power.74 Congress sought to maintain a free market by supporting
68. Mergers Still Threaten Small Business, Says House Panel's Report, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 9, 1962, at 3.
69. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7, 32 (1966).
70. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
71. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as 15 U.S.C.S §§ 1-7).
72. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2010)).
73. See generally MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE: A
TALE OF TODAY (1873).
74. Soon after its enactment, the Sherman Act was weakened by courts as they
interpreted its ambiguous terms narrowly. See Rudolph J. Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in
Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 287 (1989)
(describing the Supreme Court's struggle with the Sherman Act and its adoption of a
"literalist" approach). Consequently, Congress proceeded with amending the Sherman Act and
followed by passing other antitrust laws to reinforce it. See Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38
Stat. 730 (codified 15 U.S.C.S §§ 12-27, 44; 29 U.S.C.S § 52); Robinson-Patman Act of
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small firms. Small firms became a symbol of fair competition free flow of
ideas, and freedom to pursue a new venture7 6 Thereafter, preconceptions of
the role of government as protector of competition followed this era and
reinforced the path of small business favoritism. 77 Great merger waves
during 1895-1905, 1925-29, 1965-68, and the early 1980s renewed debate
over the extent of government intervention necessary to maintain free
competition.
78
During those waves, Congress was reluctant to limit conglomerates and
interfere in market forces too greatly. Therefore, Congress assumed the role
of guardian of small firms. Instead of directly restricting large firms, it
sought indirectly to help small business complete with its counterparts. To
reduce the incentives for big businesses to merge, Congress eliminated
1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (codifiedl5 U.S.C.S §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a); Miller-Tydings Fair
Trade Act of 1937, ch.690, title VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (codified 15 U.S.C.S § 1); District of
Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 673; Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 281, 69
Stat. 282 (1955); Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801;
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383;
Export Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233; Antitrust Amendments Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2879.
75. See, e.g., 97 CONG. REC. 6773 (1951) (statement of Rep. Abraham J. Multer (D.,
NY)) (discussing the Robinson-Patman Act, Rep. Multer stated, "Competition is healthy. But
unfair, cutthroat competition has the effect of destroying competition by forcing independents
out of business and leaving the field clear for monopoly."). See also STAFF OF S. SELECT
COMM. ON SMALL Bus., SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLY, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION: MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES AND SMALL BusINESS, 82-2 CIS-NO: S5250 (1952);
128 CONG. REC. 9177 (1982) (statement of Rep. Samuel Augustus Nunn, Jr. ("I have briefly
reviewed these statistics to demonstrate that small business is not a special interest group in
our American economy. Small business is the heart of the free enterprise system, that sector
most likely to take the steps necessary to get this Nation back of the road to economic
recovery.").
76. See 103 Cong. Rec. 10, 208 (1957) (statement of Rep. Paul Brown) ("Small
business is a symbol of opportunity, enterprise, innovation, and achievement. It is an
independent way of life, standing for something quite essential to our freedom.").
77. See Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and Institutional
Investment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977,992 (1993).
78. Harvard economics professor Andrei Shleifer and University of Chicago finance
professor Robert W. Vishny claim four major merger waves occurred in the twentieth century.
Andrei Shleifcr & Robert W. Vishny, The Takeover Wave of The 1980s, 249 SCIENCE 745
(1990). The first one came as a reaction to the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, and ended in
the beginning of the twentieth century with several Supreme Court decisions and the Clayton
Act. Id. at 745. The second merger wave began in late 1920, coinciding with a buoyant stock
market, and ended in the Great Depression. Id. at 745. The third wave came in the late 1960s,
when conglomerate mergers were initiated in a stock market boom. Id. at 745. The last one
was the takeover wave of the 1980s, which was characterized by a great number of hostile
takeovers. Id. at 746.
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benefits associated with mergers and takeovers. 79 Congress also increased the
lending authority of small business organizations as a way to enable small
businesses to resist mergers or acquisitions and tripled the damages in
antitrust claims against large companies.
8
0
Although trends in antitrust regulation and enforcement changed over the
decades, small business, as a symbol of free enterprise, remained an
unwavering element of business culture.81 For a brief period during the
1980s, small businesses lost their special status in the eyes of the
79. See Louis M. Kohlmeier, Antitrust Offensive, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1969, at I
("Already the House Ways and Means Committee is considering a measure to limit the tax
benefits to conglomerates that issue debentures in exchange for stock of a company being
acquired.").
80. Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits any person injured as a result of an antitrust
violation to sue and recover triple the damages sustained. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
81. Small business favoritism through antitrust was interrupted during the merger wave
of the 1980s and the laissez-faire macroeconomic policies of the Reagan administration that
can be summed up as "bigness doesn't necessarily mean badness." Reagan's new agenda
sought to deregulate and relax antitrust enforcement efforts against large businesses in the
name of efficiency. The Reagan administration, which contained many supporters of the
"Chicago School" of economics, contended that antitrust law overprotects inefficient small
businesses. See generally SEAN WILENTZ, THE AGE OF REAGAN: A HISTORY 1974-2008
(2009); JOHN EHRMAN, THE EIGHTIES: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF REAGAN (2008); Robert E.
Taylor & Stan Crock, Giant Steps, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1981, at 1 (quoting Reagan's new
Attorney General William French Smith who attacked past enforcement of antitrust laws as
"misguided and mistaken ... efficient firms shouldn't be hobbled under the guise of antitrust
enforcement"). Conservatives who opposed government interference in the economy such as
Robert H. Bork, an antitrust law professor and author of THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978),
advocated the adoption of a "consumer welfare" approach, that is the maximization of direct
and immediate welfare of the consumers of a certain product. See also Robert H. Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 32 (1966) (arguing the
courts need to distinguish between agreements or activities that increase wealth through
efficiency and those that decrease it through restriction of output); Joseph F. Brodley, The
Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1021 (1987). But see James Bovard, Soaring Succor for Select Businesses,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1984, at 24 ("When Mr. Reagan first took office, administration officials
spoke of abolishing export subsidies, slashing agricultural supports and leaving the private
sector to its own devices. But this administration has given more aid to business than any
other administration in history."). The Reagan administration was able to veer off in an
opposite direction, and bigness was no longer a symbol of villainy but of promising
prosperity. Yet, even this temporary halt in the path of small business preferences did not have
a long-term effect on small businesses preferential status. It was not long before small
business culture regained its standing in the eyes of the government, viewing small business
owners as the gatekeepers of free competition. Id
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82administration, while big companies were portrayed as victims and
unreasonably prosecuted under antitrust laws.83 In his efforts to balance the
budget and close the nation's deficit, Reagan suggested cutting federal
borrowing, including the SBA's loan program. 84 Reagan went as far as
proposing to abolish the SBA by eradicating its loan programs and placing
85some of its remaining functions in the Commerce Department.
Nevertheless, this temporary halt in largesse toward small businesses did
not have a long-term effect on their preferential status. Strong support from
small business committees and Democrats hindered Reagan's efforts to
eradicate the SBA and ultimately lead to an increase in the SBA's lending
authority. 86 It was not long before small business culture was resurgent, and
the government again viewed small business owners as the gatekeepers of
free competition.
82. At some point, Reagan's policies even started to harm small business. For example,
the antitrust division in the Reagan administration did not actively prosecute many antitrust
cases. See Taylor & Crock, supra note 81, at I ('Cases didn't get filed on the basis of
Populist ideas of economic pluralism,' says Mr. Shenefield, the former antitrust chief."). In
another case, government officials testified at a hearing of the House Monopolies
Subcommittee in favor of certain mergers of large financial-services companies. Big
Financial-Services Mergers Don't Hurt Competition or Consumers, U.S. Aides Say, WALL ST.
J., July 9, 198 1, at 6.
83. Taylor & Crock, supra note 81, at I ("[A] bill to give surer antitrust exemptions to
companies that combined forces on export business.").
84. Laurie McGinley, Treasury Borrowing Needs Are Projected At $203 Billion New
Cash In Fiscal Year 1984, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1983, at 5 ("Under the administration's
proposal, the Small Business Administration's subsidized direct-loan program would end, as
would the mortgage-purchase activities by the Government National Mortgage Association.").
85. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 98 Stat. 1057 (1984);
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, H.R. 3128, 99th Cong., 100 Stat.
82, 99 (1986); Administration's Budget Proposal for the SBA for Fiscal Year 1988: Hearing
before S. Comm. on Small Bus., 100th Cong. 100-32 (1987); Robert W. Merry, Reagan
Strategy Aims to Slash Programs and Not Just Dollars, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 4; Plan
to Eliminate SBA As Agency Proposed Again, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1986. When his efforts
were fruitless, Reagan went as far as nominating a new SBA administrator to execute his
plans to abolish SBA loans through the back-door. See Albert R. Karr, SBA Head Fires Five
Regional Chiefs Who Oppose Plan To Close Down Agency, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1986, at 20;
Steven P. Galante, Reagan To Name Sen. Abdnor SBA Head, Signaling End to Effort To Close
Agency, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1986, at 23.
86. See, e.g., Peter Rodino, Fearing Effects of Large Mergers, Plans House Hearings on
Antitrust Policy, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1981, at 21 (House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Peter Rodino (D-NJ) questioning whether small businesses could survive in an economy in
which all economic assets were concentrated in a few large corporations); Tim Carrington,
Raiding Republican Turf, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1984, at 62 (Democrats woo small business);
Senate Committee Insists That It Has Votes To Save SBA, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1985, at 6;
Senate Business Panel Backs Funding of SBA, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1985, at 23.
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C. Small Business Culture in Light of Exogenous Crises
Small business's failure to acclimate to extrinsic, apolitical forces was
viewed by the government over the decades as a national problem. The
government felt particularly responsible for the condition of small businesses
and at times culpable for the woes they experienced. A historical sequence of
extreme events that originated outside the socio-economic system, such as
hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods, had a large effect on the expansion of
small business favoritism. Consequently, the government used its power to
regulate the market and to grant small business temporary relief that became
permanent even when the threat had passed.
In his book Crisis and Leviathan, Robert Higgs argues that the main
reason for the expansion of government lies in its responses to crises such as
economic turmoil, natural disasters and war.87 The extension of government
emergency power, according to Higgs, endures long after each crisis has
passed, encroaching on civil and economic liberties and fostering extensive
corporate welfare. 88 As the government's power grows, writes Higgs, it
becomes autonomic and maintains its size and scope. 89 Aside from the
expansion of government, economic shocks, such as the recent economic
downturn, also generate benefits to certain groups that persist even after the
crisis is resolved. 90
Seen as a particularly vulnerable part of the production chain, small
business favoritism has expanded during crises. For example, on March 27,
1964, a forceful earthquake struck Alaska followed by seismic waves
devastating much of Anchorage and many seacoast towns. 91 Although there
were no casualties, the impact of the quake was serious.92 That same year, a
series of six Atlantic hurricanes killed over 200 civilians and caused an
estimated at $2.5 billion in property damage in Florida, Louisiana, Texas,
Georgia, and North Carolina.93 Floods in Montana and the Ohio River
87. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN 17 (1989).
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id. at 189.
90. Id. at 168.
91. MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, PIONEERING A MODERN SMALL BusINEss: WAKEFIELD
SEAFOODS AND THE ALASKAN FRONTIER 92 (1979).
92. Id.
93. On the economic effect of these hurricanes, see Arnold L. Sugg, Economic Aspects
of Hurricanes, MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 143 (1967), available at http://www.bama.ua.edu
/-jcsenkbeil/gy4570/sugg%201I967%20economic.pdf.
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Valley, forest fires in California, and a big cloudburst in Arizona were other
natural catastrophes that year.
94
As an immediate response to these catastrophes, the government
enlarged lending to small business. Congress authorized the SBA to make
immediate disaster loans totaling about $49.5 million.95 Consequently, the
SBA curtailed its regular small business loan program to preserve money for
disaster lending. 96 In September 1964, President Johnson asked Congress to
bail out the SBA with a $60 million supplemental appropriation to its
depleted reserves in the wake of the hurricanes, earthquakes and floods.
97
Yet, these allowances, which were created to support small firms in a
time of emergency, remained in place after the danger had passed. Two years
after the Alaska calamity, Congress voted to continue to divert money to
meet heavy demand for SBA disaster loans.98 Started as a temporary solution
to an immediate problem, the SBA disaster assistance programs became
permanent and remain operative to this day. Over the years, the loan program
was expanded to offer low interest loans to homeowners, renters, non-profit
organizations, and businesses of all sizes. 99 Much like the 1960s disasters,
the same pattern of government response can be seen in recent disasters,
including the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.'10
Lastly, due to their increased risk of failure, small businesses have
constantly faced tight credit and difficulties in securing capital or borrowing
94. See generally E. L. Quarantelli & Russell R. Dynes, Response to Social Crisis and
Disaster, 3 ANN. REV. SOC. 23 (1977); THEODORE STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL
HISTORY OF NATURAL DISASTER IN AMERICA 41-47 (2006).
95. Small Business Agency Curbs Loans to Firms: Cites Disaster Lending, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 1964, at 3.
96. Id. The unusual number of disasters reduced its revolving funds "to the point where
conservation measures are required." Id.
97. Johnson Requests $60 Million to Replenish the Small Business Administration's
Loan Fund, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1964, at 12.
98. The legislation also created two revolving funds, one for the physical disaster
program and one for SBA's regular projects. See Small Business Agency's Loan Limit and
Funds Increased by Senate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1966, at 5.
99. SBA DISASTER ASSISTANCE, http://www.sba.gov/services/disasterassistance (last
visited Jan. 13, 2012).
100. As a response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the government approved an
increase to the SBA lending authority. The SBA approved 128 economic injury assistance
loans, totaling more than $8.5 million, for small businesses in the Gulf Coast affected by the
spill. Additionally, the agency granted deferments on 531 existing SBA disaster loans in the
region, totaling more than $2.6 million per month in payments. See Heidi Avery, The Ongoing
Administration-Wide Response to the Deepwater BP Oil Spill: June 30, 2010, THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (July 1, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov.
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loans. 01 Therefore, the equity gap between small business demand for
outside sources of funding and the supply of capital or loans to these firms is
often wide. 10 2 Congress, through various small business programs, tried to
mitigate the effects of this constant equity gap of small business funding. For
example, at certain times, the government allowed banks to charge more
interest over the prime on its SBA loans that were 90% guaranteed by the
government to encourage banks that were increasingly hesitant to lend on
such terms, even when the government assumed most of the risk. 10 3 And
although the supply of credit to small business is strongly correlated to the
inherent risk premium small business possesses, the government
continuously tried to "repair" the credit market and mitigate the effect of the
equity gap on small businesses.
Likewise, recessions are another type of event over which Congress had
little control. But lawmakers, nevertheless, have attempted to address the
effect of recessions on the economy. Since small businesses often have tiny
reserves, they can be deeply affected by recessions. Such was true in the
recessions at the beginning of the 1970s and the 1980s. 1°4 High inflation,
which added to debts, had an especially devastating effect on small
businesses, which had perennial difficulty in obtaining capital in the first
place. 10 5 Between 1973-1975 and 1980-1982, recessions forced many
businesses to close and many people lost their jobs. 1°6 Tight credit
101. See generally Richard J. Judd & Barbra K. Sanders, Regulation, Small Business,
and Economic Development: A Historical Perspective on Regulation of Business, in POLICY
STUDIES ORGANIZATION, SMALL BUSINESS IN A REGULATED ECONOMY: ISSUES AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 223 (Richard J. Judd et al. eds., 1988).
102. Id. See also John A. Prestbo, Going it Alone: More Individuals Buck Alarming
Rate To Start Own Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1969, atl ("Many banks shun new business
loans as too risky even when money is not tight... ").
103. Yet, when business failures continued to soar, small businesses blamed the SBA
for not addressing the problem properly. Sanford L. Jacobs, SBA's Plan to Cut Loan Rates
Generates Lots of Opposition, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29
104. Recessions in the 1980s caused more than 5,550 small businesses to go under,
14% above the rate of the recession during the early 1970s. See Amal Nag, Slump Devastates
Small Businesses; Failures Threaten to Slow Recovery, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1980, at 27 ("We
are seeing a fairly unique situation that is hurting small businesses worse than any previous
recession .... ).
105. See Sanford L. Jacobs, Survival When Business is Bad Requires a Plan, Lots of
Cuts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1982, at 25.
106. Lack of credit and high interest rates contributed to business failures in the 1980s.
See Sanford L. Jacobs, Steep Borrowing Costs Tied to Prime Rate Make Going Tough for
Small Businesses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1980, at 19 ("'I'm sick. I'm just sick,' the 58-year-old
entrepreneur says. 'I'm worried more and more as I go along. This interest rate is too much..
' [Hligh interest rates 'are the greatest contributor to current business failures."').
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aggravated small business' failures. 107 In the midst of those recessions,
lawmakers and presidents provided increased benefits to small firms and
granted the SBA greater lending authority'0 8 to fight unemployment,
recession, and other economic ills.'°9
Economic recovery and stimulus acts were part of the artillery used to
fight economic crises.o Once created, that path of small business assistance
often remains unchanged."' To address the problem of tight credit, the
107. Representative Virginia Smith (R., NE) spoke on the floor during National Small
Business Week, commenting "During these difficult economic times, the spirit of small
business has been tested..." 128 CONG. REC. 9572 (1982). See Thomas Petzinger, Jr., Closed
Doors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1980, at 1.
108. For example, during the 19 60s the government approved many expansions of the
SBA loan program to address the tight credit problem of small firms. Small Business Agency
Loan Ceiling Increase is Approved by House, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1962, at 3; House Unit
Votes to Raise SBA's Ceiling on Loans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1962, at 26; Small Business
Agency Loan Ceiling Raised $250 Million by Senate, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1962, at 14.
Higher SBA Loan Limit Backed by Senate Panel, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1980, at 3.
109. Kennedy Readies Program to Curb Jobless Roll Rise, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,
1960, at 3 (announcing that more loans will be granted to small business concerns at interest
rates lower than the current rates charged by the SBA to help provide additional jobs). See
also Small Business Agency Cuts Interest Loans in 101 Distressed Area, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
1961, at 3. See, also, Credit Crunch, Year-End Recession Loom, Democrats of Joint Economic
Panel Warn, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1973, at 4; Jerry Landauer, Democrats' Slowness in
Paying Their Bills Irks Small Businesses, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1980, at I. ("When President
Carter, in the midst of his Iranian and Afghanistan troubles, took time out to address 2,000
representatives of small business last month, it was considered a powerful testament to the
political importance of the group . . . . But . . . [a]s far as they're [Small Businesses]
concerned, the President could start by getting the Democratic Party to honor its debts.");
Sanford L. Jacobs, Updates on Some 1982 Stories of Interest to Small Concerns, WALL ST. J.,
Jan 3, 1983, at 25.
110. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. In this act,
Congress created the "Accelerated Cost Recovery System" (ACRS), and liberalized the
depreciation rules by changing the recovery period of certain assets retroactively. Although
this measure was presented as a small-business aid, it did not provide aid to concerns that did
not have enough new assets put into service or enough profits to offset against those
deductions. Eventually, those rules resulted in some small firms trading their depreciation
benefits with their larger counterparts. 128 CONG. REC. 9177 (1982). See also Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Sanford L. Jacobs, How Changes in the Tax Law
Will Affect Small Companies, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 31.
Ill. See Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1961, at I (reporting that members of the
House Ways and Means committee sponsored a bill that gave further tax relief to small
business by providing additional depreciation deductions while expanding the policy in place
from 1958 that permitted small businesses expensing 20% of the cost of certain newly
purchased equipment). See also Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No.102-564, 106 Stat. 4249; Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000
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government sought to enlarge the availability of funding," 12 relax the
limitations on federally guaranteed loans, and encourage transactions with
small businesses.'3 It also collaborated with banking associations to provide
joint long-term loans to small business. 
11 4
D. Small Business Culture Promotes Social Justice
Since many minority firms are small businesses, affirmative action is
another positive result of small business culture. 1 5 Financed primarily by
personal and family savings, aiding small businesses has been seen as a way
to aid minorities by encouraging their economic independence." 6 Small
businesses were sought as playing a central role in creating jobs and
nurturing the advancement of minorities.' 7 Because Asians, Blacks,
Hispanics and Native Americans have long faced discrimination in the
workplace, fostering minority business ownership was considered an anti-
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2762. Both of these acts extended appropriations to small
business loan programs.
112. Arlen J. Large, R & D Funding for Small Firms Sets Off Big Fight in Congress,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 29. See 127 CONG. Rac. 29,733 (1981) (statement of Sen.
Warren Rudman) ("Let there be no mistake about this: S. 881 is not a small business relief
bill. Rather, it is designed to address a specific problem in the most efficient manner .... )
113. For example, the Reagan Administration established the Small Business
Innovation Research Program, a set aside program requiring federal agencies to allocate a
share of their research and development budgets to small research and development firms.
Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-219, 96 Stat. 219.
114. Long-Term Loans Offered to Small Firms in Joint Banking Industry-SBA
Program, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1962, at 5; SBA Boosts Ceiling For Interest Charges on Fixed-
Rate Loans, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1980, at 42; Sanford L. Jacobs, SBA 's Plan to Cut Loan
Rates Generates Lots of Opposition, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1981, at 29 ("None of this solves
the basic problem of brutally high interest rates that many small companies simply can't
afford.").
115, For example, in 2002, more than half of Black-owned businesses had less than
$10,000 in business receipts in 2002, compared with one-third of White-owned firms and 28.8
percent of Asian-owned firms.. Asians had the smallest proportion of businesses-0.04
percent-with 500 or more employees, and these large firms accounted for less than 7 percent
of Asian business receipts. See SMALL Bus. Assoc., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, Minority in
Business: A Demographic Review of Minority Business Ownership, at 25 (2007), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs298tot.pdf.
116. Id. at 13.
117. Press Release, S. Comm. on Fin., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009: Near 100 Percent of Finance Effects Will Come in First Two Years, 2 (2009) (on file
with author) ("The finance business tax provisions are designed to help generate immediate
cash [to small business] and prevent further job loss.").
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discrimination measure to improve their employment prospects and well-
being.
11 8
Small businesses have also been a place for women to get ahead." 9
During World War II, when industrial jobs considered quintessentially
masculine were transferred to women as part of the war effort, women began
to gain respect and fair treatment in the workplace. 20 During the postwar
period, American values returned to domesticity and familial roles of
women. Still, small businesses offered an opportunity for women to earn
money outside the home, even if the jobs were often fairly traditional.
12 1
Employed women mostly worked in retail sales, personnel, and educational
service, the so-called female ghetto. 122 "The years in the mid-century
essentially marked time for women in business, riding out the storms of
economic and diplomatic collapse while witnessing incremental change in
the number of women workers, managers, and entrepreneurs" concluded
Angel Kwolek-Folland, a leading historian of women in American
business.123 At the end of the twentieth century, American women were
118. See, e.g., CHARLES V. DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33284, MINORITY
CONTRACTING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR DISADVANTAGED SMALL BUSINESSES: LEGAL
ISSUES (2006); Government Minority Small Business Programs: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Minority Small Bus. Enterprise of the H. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 92nd Cong. 351 (1972)
("These men have become owner-operators. They like to drive, but because of discrimination
by the industry, the only way a black man can be assured of driving a truck is by buying the
thing and running it himself."); Availability of Credit to Minority-Owned Small Businesses:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Deposit Ins.
of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong. (1994); Subcommittee
Hearing on Minority and Hispanic Participation in the Federal Workforce and the Impact on
the Small Business Community: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Regulations, Health Care,
and Trade of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. (2008).
119. See, e.g., U.S. Campaign Encourages Women to Own Businesses, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1977, at 33; Juanita M. Kreps, Preparing Women to Be Entrepreneurs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1977; Jennifer Roback, Torn Between Family and Career? Give Birth To A
Business, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1983, at 30; More Women Owning Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1984, at D-14; Steven P. Galante, Composition of Delegates Reveals Rise of Women in
Small Business, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1986, at 23.
120. RUTH MILKMAN, GENDER AT WORK: THE DYNAMICS OF JOB SEGREGATION BY SEX
DURING WORLD WAR II 5 (1987).
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 12.
123. ANGEL-KWOLEK-FOLLAND, INCORPORATING WOMEN: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND
BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES 168 (1998).
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starting new businesses at twice the rate of men and owned almost a third of
existing firms.
124
Over the years, government agencies altered their approach to small
businesses, shifting from a neutral stance on race and gender to one with race
and gender preferences. 125 Congress increased federal assistance programs
and anti-poverty bills providing preferential treatment, grants, education, and
jobs to help minorities and women. 126 The SBA boosted minority hiring
within the agency and began to act against racial discrimination by
lenders. 127 The SBA investigated complaints of racial discrimination and
upon discovery of such conduct accelerated the loan maturity or took the
borrower to court.' 28 Affirmative action became a priority for the SBA,
which created the position of Special Assistant for Minority Groups to
supervise minority recruitment within the agency.129 The SBA also founded
the Women's Speaker's Bureau to encourage women to pursue business
careers, to set aside top-level positions for women, and to authorize micro-
loans to women-owned businesses.
130
Another path the government took to promote minority small business
was developing a minority loan program with favorable conditions. 131 It was
124. When discussing the Small Business Tax Fairness Act, Congressman William
Reynolds Archer, Jr. (R-TX), Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, noted that
2000 would be the first year in our entire history where women will own more than half of all
businesses, about 8 million, across the nation. 146 CONG. REC. 792, 843 (2000). In 2002, it
was reported that of 22,974,655 existing firms, 6,489,259 firms (28.2%) were owned by
women. YING LowREY, U.S. SMALL Bus. Assoc., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, Minority in
Business: A Demographic Review of Minority Business Ownership 5 (2007), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs298tot.pdf.
125. Scholars attributed this tendency to administrative pragmatism, reaction to the
urban riots of the 1960s, or elitism. JONATHAN J. BEAN, BIG GOVERNMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: THE SCANDALOUS HISTORY OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 39 (2001).
126. Jonathan Spivak, Poverty Fight Plans, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1964, at 1. For
example, as part of President Johnson's anti-poverty bill, the administration enabled the SBA
to expand its limit for minority loans. Id.
127. BEAN, supra note 125, at 40.
128. Id. at 42.
129. Id. at44.
130. Id. at 44. See also More Aid for Small Businesses Proposed, With Emphasis on
Minority Entrepreneurs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1970, at 5; Johnnie L. Roberts, After Rough
Start, Venture-Capital Firm Finds Success Backing Minority Businesses, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 1984, at 29.
131. Business in Riots to Get SBA Loans, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1967, at 26. President
Johnson ordered the Small Business Administration to make long-term, low interest loans
available to homeowners and small businessmen in riot-torn areas of Detroit to help them
rebuild. Id.
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well known that minority business owners found it harder to start a business
in crime-ridden areas.' 32 They were refused loans by traditional lenders
because they were considered to have a greater risk of failure than white
business owners.1 33 Yet for minority men and women, starting a business
was a way to move up the economic ladder.
The government also created the Office of Minority Business Enterprise
program at the SBA, which established Minority Enterprise Small Business
Investment Companies (MESBIC) to encourage new minority businesses.'
34
These programs sought to help Blacks, Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans,
Native Americans, and others become businesspersons and offered
incentives for corporations to locate plants in urban slums. 35 Yet, soon the
MESBIC program was criticized for its inefficiency and for providing
meager funding to minority small businesses.136 Scandals related to the
MESBIC program and investigations that revealed funds awarded through
questionable grants further undermined the program's credibility.
3
1
Consequently, supporters of race-neutrality pressed Congress to open the
program to the general "disadvantaged" population.
138
Naturally, when the government tried to alter its small business
affirmative action programs such as scrutinizing the SBA Minority
Development Program, it encountered political resistance. 39 Affirmative
132. Everett Groseclose, A Black Businessman Finds It's Hard to Get New Firm Off
Ground, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1969, at 1.
133. John A. Prestbo, Going it Alone, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1969, at 1. (noting that
many banks shun new business loans as too risky even when money is not tight).
134. S. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL Bus., STUDY OF MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
PROGRAMS, S. REP. No. 95-629, at 109-10, 112-13 (1978). See also Darrin, supra note 32, at
472-73 (arguing that the SBIC/MESBIC program has not been successful in providing debt
and equity capital to small businesses).
135. Monroe W. Karmin, Minority Enterprise, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1969, at 20.
136. For example, in 1977 a task force of investment bankers concluded that
SBIC/MESBIC assistance to small businesses was "inefficient and inappropriate, [and] that it
reached only two-tenths of one percent of small business in existence at that time." Long-Term
Implications of Current Budgetary and Economic Trends on Unemployment, Minority
Business and Education: Hearing Before the Task Force on Human Cmty Res. of the H.
Comm. on Budget, 96th Cong. 74 (1979) (statement of Dr. Edward Irons). See also Burt
Schorr, Ailing Entrepreneurs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1969, at 1.
137. BEAN, supra note 125, at 87. Note, for example, the Whitewater Scandal, one of
the most known political scandals in 1999, when President Clinton was charged with
influencing an SBIC to grant an SBA minority loan to a firm owned by the Clintons. See infra
note 261.
138. BEAN, supra note 125, at 88.
139. Sanford L. Jacobs, Trade Secrets... Minorities, SBA Clash... Malls Exhibitors,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1981, at 31 ("Minority Business supporters clash with the Small Business
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action for minority businesses has been criticized for intensifying the
segregation of minorities and their reliance on local markets.140 Nevertheless,
it remains a strong part of small business culture to this day maintained
through the SBA 8(a) Business Development Program, the SBA Office of
Native American Affairs, the Minority Business Development Agency,
etc. 
141
IV. A NETWORK OF SELF-REINFORCING SMALL BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
Along with small business culture, institutional path dependence
contributed significantly to the persistence of small business programs. Our
nation's political and cultural organizations helped shape current small
business benefit patterns. They assisted the government in determining
which alternatives should be pursued to benefit the constituents they
represent and at the same time reinforced their own existence. 14 Three major
small business organizations provided these self-reinforcement dynamics-
the House and Senate Small Business Congressional Committees and the
Small Business Administration. While these organizations were beneficial in
serving as agents for, and promoting the interests of, small firms, they were
also influential in blocking changes to the original path of small business
programs. These organizations played a major role in leading Congress down
a path from a traditional rational-based test, by which preferences are given
to those who deserve them, toward an unrelenting favoritism of small
business.
Through the establishment of certain agencies and organizations that
created self-reinforcement dynamics, small business incumbents paved the
path for small business institutional favoritism and, once created, shaped it
over the years. During the 1940s, unique conditions allowed Congress to take
administration over SBA Administrator Michael Cardenas' efforts to limit the 8(a) program,
which sets aside government contracts for minority companies. Mr. Cardenas wants to hustle
some companies out of the program. Some have grown big. Some have abused the system and
refuse to repay SBA advances. The SBA has proposed rules that would boot out companies
after three or five years, depending on the type of business; those already in the program could
be terminated sooner.").
140. BEAN, supra note 125, at 53.
141. Id. at 90. Technically the SBA Minority Enterprise Program is color-blind and
therefore has resisted constitutional challenge. See also, SBA, Minority Owned Businesses,
available at: http://www.sba.gov/content/minority-owned-businesses.
142. See, e.g., infra notes 163-68.
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a specific trajectory and form specialized small business committees. 43
These Select Small Business Committees and later the SBA played a central
role in encouraging Congress to create, expand, and sustain small business
programs.'44 Other Congresses continued this path, broadening the scope of
small business programs, even when conditions did not warrant doing so.
Rarely has Congress considered abolishing or limiting the small business
programs; rather, it followed the SBA and the small business committees'
recommendations to add funding authority and expand subsidies to small
businesses. 145
A. Congressional Small Business Committees
During the 1940s, Capitol Hill officially opened its doors to small
business, and it has not left since. The Senate Special Committee to Study
and Survey Problems of American Small Business Enterprises was
established in 1940 and its authority was later transferred to the Senate Select
Small Business Committee.' 46 In 1941, the House of Representatives
established a committee to investigate the national defense program in its
143. See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1077 (1979) (reviewing a list of 'interrelated' federal
statutes of small business preferences, such as: the Reclamation Act of 1902, which limited
the sale of water from federal irrigation projects to a single owner; the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 that relaxed restrictions to large utility firms provided that local firms
were left unharmed; the Small Business Act of 1942, which declared congressional policy to
assure "small- business concerns [a] fair proportion" of government procurement contracts;
and, the Surplus Property Act of 1944, which gave preference to small purchaser when
disposing of federal war production facilities.)
144. The House Small Business Select Committee was formed in 1941 and was
reauthorized every year until 1975 when it became a standing committee. The Senate Select
committee is a standing committee formed in 1950. S. Res. 58, 81st Cong. (1950). In 1953,
Congress enacted the Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232, which
formed the SBA to "aid, counsel, assist and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of
small-business concerns." The SBA was made permanent in the Small Business Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384.
145. Tax Revision Hearings Open; Relieffor Small Firms Urged by Witnesses, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 8, 1958, at 9 ("The witnesses yesterday, urging tax help for small business ...
maintained the Government would not lose tax revenue from the changes since business
activity and employment would expand as a result of the increased investment by the small
firms.").
146. Report of A Special Committee To Conduct Small Business Survey, S. Res. 298,
S.Rep. 2052, 76th Cong., 86 CONG. REC. 10708, 10865 (1940). See also PARRIS, supra note
10, at 172 (appointing special committee to study and survey problems of American small
business enterprises).
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relation to small business 147 that later was converted into the House Select
Small Business Committee. 148 While these committees started with
temporary mandates and no operative or legislative authority, they were re-
approved every year until given permanent standing status. 149 Although
unable to consider bills, the committees' mandates included inquiring
generally into the problems of American small business, and proposing ways
to advance and preserve the interests of small businesses. 50
These Small Business Committees have had considerable influence.
They often hold hearings with scholars, businessmen, and government
agencies and prepare reports urging the House and Senate to adopt or amend
legislation. In the midst of merger waves, the Small Business Committees
warned Congress of the threat to small businesses and suggested what steps
lawmakers should consider in addition to tightening antitrust legislation.
15'
To improve the competitive position of small firms, the committees
encouraged Congress to grant a greater proportion of government research
and development contracts to small business concerns on a regular basis and
promoted greater use of competitive bidding by the Pentagon in the
147. H.R. Res. 294, 77th Cong., 86 CONG. REC. 9418 (1941) ("[D]efense contracts are
being given to the larger corporations, with whom the small manufacturer cannot compete,
and that certain sections of the country are getting a disproportionate share of defense work
while other sections are neglected.") (statement of Rep. Sabath).
148. H.R. REP. No. 68 (1947); H.R. Res. 18, 80th Cong. (1947).
149. The House Select Small Business Committee was given permanent status in 1974
as part of Rep. Boiling's proposal to Rep. Hansen's reform proposal of the House committees.
H.R. Res. 988, 93d Cong. 120 CONG. REC. 33,705 (1974) (enacted). The Select Senate
Committee became a standing committee in 1981. S. Res. 101, 97th Cong. 127 CONG. REC.
5130 (1981) (enacted). When the Senate unanimously approved the resolution to grant the
small business committee a permanent status, it explained it was sending "a clear signal to the
American people that the problems of small business are not to be ignored or forgotten." 127
CONG. REC. 31940 (1981). On June 29, 2001, its name was changed to the Senate Committee
on Small Business and Entrepreneurship. S. Res. 123, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. 12,493
(2001) (enacted).
150. See, e.g., Greater Federal Aid to Small Businesses Urged by House Unit, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 10, 1963, at 13. Consequently, small business committees were frequent initiators
of leading small business acts in Congress. See, e.g., Senate Unit Asks Change in Small
Business Investment Program to Make It a "Success ", WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1960, at 6. See
also Arlen J. Large, R&D Funding for Small Firms Sets Off Big Fight in Congress, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 29.
151. Mergers Still Threaten Small Business, Says House Panel's Report, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 9, 1962, at 3.
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procurement contracts reserved for small businesses.152 Congress frequently
followed these recommendations. 153
Nevertheless, the most significant contribution of these committees came
in the creation of the SBA. The committees supervised the SBA and small
business programs closely in a friendly capacity. 54 This was relatively easy
given their similar mandates, common clientele, and friendships between
committee and SBA members. 155 Although they lacked legal authority to
control SBA activities, the committees exercised power to discuss and
criticize the SBA's operations. They held extensive hearings on various
government policy and program matters affecting small business and the
SBA.1 56 Having such allies in Capitol Hill helped small business
organizations maintain and strengthen their influence in Congress and
contributed to the perpetuation of their preferences. 
157
152. Senate Small Business Committee Urges More Bids in Pentagon Buying, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 13, 1961, at 7.
153. Greater Federal Aid To Small Businesses Urged by House Unit, WALL ST. J., Jan.
10, 1963, at 13. President Kennedy allocated a greater number of defense contracts to small
business. Id.
154. Higher SBA Loan Limit Backed by Senate Panel, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1980, at
3.
155. For example, many committee members continued to support the agency's
actions even when they served on other committees and held other strategic positions. PARRIS,
supra note 10, at 172.
156. For example, at some point the House committee called to abolish the SBA's
Loan Policy Board for lack of efficiency in promoting small business loans. See Wild Horses
and Woolly Lenders, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1965, at 16. The committees' chairmen were
considered very knowledgeable about small business, and had significant influence over the
SBA. PARRIS, supra note 10, at 172-73. For the history of the long-time chairman of the
Senate Small Business Committee between 1955 and 1967, Senator John Sparkman (D., Ala.),
see The Biography of John J. Sparkman at the John J. Sparkman Center, REDSTONE ARSENAL,
available at http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/sparkman/sparkbio.htm (last visited Sept.
17, 2012).
157. PARRIS, supra note 10, at 173 (reporting that Congressman Patman and Senator
Sparkman both left their respective Small Business chairs to serve on the Banking and
Currency Committees.) However, in 1981 the Senate Small Business Committee initiated a
two-month investigation and hearings on SBA procurement practices. The committee found
evidence of ignored procurement rules and of administration officials granting personal favors
and pushing through contract awards without competition. Yet such incidents were exceptions
to the general good relations between the committees and the SBA, as they both worked for
the same cause of serving as the small businessperson's liaison in the government, preserving
and promoting small business preferential treatment. Sanford L. Jacobs, SBA 's Procurement
Practices Come Under Senate Scrutiny, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 27, 1981, at 33.
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B. The Birth of the SBA
One of the most significant moments in small business history was the
creation of the Small Business Administration. The SBA grew out of a series
of agencies tracing back to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC)
from the times of the Great Depression, and was modeled after the War
Finance Corporation of World War I (both of which supported state and local
government loans to banks, railroads, and firms of all sizes).'58 By 1942,
large industries were enjoying a big share of wartime defense contracts, and
Congress became concerned about the state of competition. To promote the
participation of small businesses in war production and give them financial
viability, Congress created the Smaller War Plants Corporation (SWPC).
159
The SWPC offered direct loans, encouraged financial institutions to provide
credit to small firms, and urged federal agencies and big businesses to
increase the participation of small business in procurement contracts. Yet the
SWPC was soon dissolved, and its lending authority was dispersed due to
criticism regarding its lack of information and expertise.' 60
Following dissolution of the SWPC, the Senate Small Business
Committee proposed a bill to create a new small business agency.' 61 On July
30, 1953, President Eisenhower signed the Small Business Act, which
created the Small Business Administration in order to provide a government
source of funding for small business - a temporary agency set to expire on
158. PARRIS, supra note 10, at 5.
159. C. WRIGHT MILLS & MELVILLE J. ULMER, SMALL BUSINESS AND CIVIC WELFARE:
REPORT OF THE SMALLER WAR PLANTS CORPORATION TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SMALL BUSINESS 364, 367 (1946).
160. The SWPC dissolved in 1945, and its lending and contract powers were disbursed
between the RFC and the Office of Small Business (OSB) in the Department of Commerce.
During the Korean War, Congress attempted again to assist small businesses by creating the
Small Defense Plants Administration (SDPA) with a mandate similar to the SWPC's
(excluding lending authority, which remained in the hands of the RFC). Amid calls to abolish
the RFC in 1952 because of some dubious loans it had made, the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency created a subcommittee headed by Senator William J. Fulbright (D.,
Ark.) to hold hearings and investigate allegations of corruption by the RFC's leaders. PARRIS,
supra note 10, at 4-18.
161. Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232. In the Small
Business Act, Congress authorized the SBA to make direct and "guaranteed" loans to small
businesses; directed it to provide technical and management assistance to small business
concerns; authorized it to enter into contracts with federal agencies and then sublet those
contracts to minority finns under Section 8(a) of the Act; and directed it to assist small
businesses in obtaining government contracts. Id.
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June 30, 1955.162 Disappointed with the effect of antitrust laws and
encouraged by the congressional select small business committees, Congress
repeatedly re-affirmed the SBA. With the support of congressional small
business committees, the SBA soon became a permanent agency and was
sought after as the official source of information for various agencies on how
proposed legislation would affect small business.' 63 At times, it seemed that
Congress had handed the SBA unsolicited authority. 64
The SBA's most significant mandate was to narrow the equity gap of
small business funding, and increase the supply of credit.1 65 Since its
establishment, the SBA has initiated and developed various small business
162. Historian Jonathan Bean summarized Congress's purpose in establishing the
SBA:
The primary legislative intent was to retain a governmental source of credit for small
business .... Anticommunist ideologues supported the creation of a small business
agency to defend independent enterprise from the 'Pinkos and the Marxist Reds' who
threatened the American Way of Life. Clearly, the shades of meaning invested in the
SBA were as varied as the small business ideology itself. The only losers were the
laissez-faire conservatives ....
JONATHAN J. BEAN, BIG GOVERNMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE SCANDALOUS
HISTORY OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 9-10 (2001) (internal footnotes omitted).
163. In 1955, although the Small Business Administrator only requested Congress to
extend the life of the Administration for two years, the Chairman of the Senate Small Business
Committee proposed instead to grant the SBA permanent status, stating "To abolish the Small
Business Administration altogether would be such an obviously backward step .... To allow
the agency to drift, uncertain of its future, would jeopardize the large investment on services
and in appropriations already made." 101 CONG. REC. 7638 (1955) (statement of Sen. Thye
(R., Minn.)). See also Agency Proposes Rise In Small Business Role In Federal Contracting,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1962, at 2 ("The [SBA] proposed new rules designed to broaden small
business participation in Government contracting.").
164. At one time, the SBA rejected additional authority the Senate had tried to give it
in determining government procurement policy:
The [SBA] told irritated Democratic Senators that it opposes their plans for the S.B.A
to assume a major role in determining Government procurement policy.
Moreover... the S.B.A was less than enthusiastic over another provision of the bill
which would give the agency an additional $75 million for loans to small businesses.
Small'Business Agency Opposes Bill Giving It Role in Government Contract Policy,
WALL. ST. J., Mar. 16, 1961, at 28. Later, the SBA revised its position. See SBA Alters Plan to
Help Small Firms Get Federal Orders; Asks More Lending Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1961,
at 5.
165. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See also Richard J. Judd & Barbra K.
Sanders, Regulation, Small Business, and Economic Development: A Historical Perspective
on Regulation of Business, in POLICY STUDIES ORGANIZATION, SMALL BUSINESS IN A
REGULATED ECONOMY: ISSUES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 223 (Richard J. Judd et al. eds.,
1988).
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lending programs. 166  The SBA routinely requests greater funding
authority, 167 even though the efficiency of its lending programs to small
business has often been questioned. 168 Among its efforts to improve the
availability of small business funding, the SBA frequently advocates for
legislation to offer financial assistance and bolster the sagging small business
credit program. 169
C. The Establishment of the SBIC Program
In 1958, the combined efforts of the congressional small business
committees and the SBA were successful in creating the Small Business
Investment Company (SBIC) program. The SBIC program was meant to
expand funding to small businesses by creating cooperation between private
investors and the government. 170The program's principal function was to fill
the "equity gap."'171 This disparity between high demand for small business
long-term finance and the availability of loans or equity-type credit to such
166. For example, in 1964 President Johnson and the SBA initiated a new lending
program designed to target "Mom and Pop" stores with less than four employees. Federal
Lending Plan to Very Small Firms Disclosed, 514 Loans Already Made as Test, WALL ST. J.,
May 27, 1964, at 6; Jonathan Spivak, Poverty-Fight Plans: Administration Pushes For Fast
Action Once Congress Passes Bill, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1964, at 1.
167. An exception was noted in 1961 when the SBA rejected additional authority
given to it by Senate; yet the SBA soon altered its position. See supra note 156.
168. SBA Says Its Loan Activity Will Fall in Fiscal '60: But Official Asks House to
Raise Lending Authority by $150 Million for Fiscal '61, WALL ST. J., May 25, 1960, at 30.
Usually the SBA's requests were granted, and the agency continued to expand. See Senate
Panel Endorses Bill for SBA to Sell 'Participation' Loans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1966, at 4;
Johnson's Plan to Sell Loans to Cut Deficit in Fiscal '67 Budget Is Opposed in Congress,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1966, at 8; but see Sanford L. Jacobs, Small Business: Still Time for
Pension Plan... Opting for Self-Employment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 25. ("A deep cut
in the Small Business Administration's loan authority is called for under Reagan budget-
tightening. The agency had planned $4.2 billion of lending for fiscal 1981, which ends Sept.
30. The President's budget-cutters want that figure reduced to $3.5 billion.").
169. Small Business Agency Seeks to Spur Loans by Commercial Banks, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 1, 1961, at 2 (noting the SBA was criticized for becoming the most rapidly expanding
agency in Washington and for making too many loans).
170. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689. See SBIC
Program Reform Is Sent Congress; Would Broaden Financial Aid, Tax Benefits, WALL ST. J.,
May 24, 1967, at 2.
171. John A. Prestbo, Going it Alone: More Individuals Buck Alarming Rate To Start
Own Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1969, atl ("Many banks shun new business loans as too
risky... and the SBA's loan funds are limited. As a result, neophyte businessmen frequently
must seek financial backing from private investors in return for equity in the enterprise.").
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concerns prompted a series of hearings in 1958.172 As a result, several bills
were introduced to narrow the small business equity gap. 7 3 One of the
proposals was the product of a collaboration between then-Senator Lyndon
B. Johnston (D-TX) and Congressman John Wright Patman (D-TX),
chairman of the House Select Committee on Small Businesses and co-author
of the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936.174
The Johnson-Patman Small Business Investment bill proposed the
creation of a Small Business Capital Bank System. 175 The idea was for local
banks to be funded by the Federal Reserve System to fulfill the long-term
requirements for capital in their area without the need for periodic
appropriations.176 A new independent Small Business Investment
Administration would supervise those banks, since the new program was
172. U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 85TH CONG., FINANCING
SMALL BUSINESS: REPORT TO THE COMMITTEES ON BANKING AND CURRENCY AND THE SELECT
COMMITTEES ON SMALL BUSINESS 13-14 (Comm. Print 1958); Financial Institutions Act of
1957 Part 2: Hearing on S. 1451 and H.R. 7026 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 85th Cong. 1548 (1958).
173. A Senate report described the legislative intent behind the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958:
This bill is the result of extensive hearings and careful consideration of the long-term
credit and equity needs of small businesses by the Committee on Banking and
Currency in both sessions of the 85th Congress. In the 1st session of the 85th
Congress, the committee held extensive hearings on S. 719, S. 2160, and S. 2286, but
deferred action upon these bills pending the results of a study on financing small
business by the Federal Reserve System.
In the present session of Congress, hearings on this subject were continued and
included consideration of S. 2160, S. 2185, S. 2286, S. 3191, S. 3643, and S. 3651.
Upon conclusion of these hearings, the committee considered all of these bills and
determined to report S. 3651 ....
S. REP. No. 85-1652, at 1 (1958).
174. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (West 2011).
175. Representative John W. Patman (D., Tex.) made the following statement:
I propose that the capital stock of each one of the 12 small-business capital banks be
$10 million. The money will not have to be borrowed by the Government and the
Government will not have to pay interest on it. It will be gotten from the Federal
Reserve banks out of their surplus funds.
Financial Institutions Act of 1957: Hearing on S. 1451 and H.R. 7026 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, supra note 166, at 1548. A similar bill was introduced in
the Senate by Johnson. However, the Banking and Currency Committees of the Senate and the
House did not report these bills. Thereafter, on April 21, 1958, the majority leader in the
Senate, Senator Johnson, introduced S.3651, which later passed the House with amendments.
H.R. REP. No. 85-2718, at 35 (1959).
176. 104 CONG. REC. 10,512 (1958) (statement of Sen. Sparkman).
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viewed as having different purposes and separate types of financing
mechanisms from the small-scale disaster and distress loans the SBA had
managed thus far.177 In essence, the new program sought to expand the flow
of long-term debt and capital equity to small concerns that were regarded as
too much of a credit risk for conventional lenders or even for the SBA's own
direct loans. In retrospect, the Johnson-Patman Small Business Investment
bill would probably have created a more efficient solution than the SBIC
program. If approved, the bill would have created an agency free from the
need for repeated appropriations from Congress, operated by financiers and
bankers, and most importantly, it would have been an independent agency
supervised by a professional authority on funding. 178
The Federal Reserve, however, objected to supervising the proposed new
agency. This, combined with opposition from the SBA and the congressional
select small business committees, put the Johnson-Patman Small Business
Investment bill to rest. On August 21, 1958, Congress adopted a different
version put forward by Senator Edward Thye (R-MN), chairman of the
Senate Small Business Committee. The revised version abandoned the idea
of an independent agency as well as the idea of non-appropriated financing,
and created the SBIC program as a division of the SBA under the supervision
of a deputy administrator.179 A few Republicans objected to the interference
of the federal government in the private sector, arguing that Congress should
focus on strengthening existing SBA programs. Nevertheless, Congress
adopted the new SBIC program with the express purpose:
[T]o improve and stimulate the national economy in general and the
small- business segment thereof in particular by establishing a program
to stimulate and supplement the flow of private equity capital and long-
term loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound
financing of their business operations and for their growth, expansion,
177. "'First, the individual investment decisions should be made, not by a bureau in
Washington, but by local businessmen who will be backing their decisions with substantial
amounts of their own money. The second goal of the system is that it should provide for
private capital to come in and take over complete ownership and operation of the system."'
H.R. REP. No. 85-2718, at 35 (1959).
178. Id.
179. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, § 201, 72 Stat. 689,
690.
180. 104 CONG. REC. 10,529 (1958) (individual views of Sen. Capehart, Sen. Bricker,
and Sen. Bennett) ("This bill should be defeated .... It would be more realistic and practical
for the Congress to strengthen the existing programs of the Small Business Administration
rather than to perpetrate this new intrusion by the Federal Government into private
business."). For a review of the legislative history of the Small Business Investment Act of
1958, see PARRIS, supra note 10, at 155.
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and modernization, and which are not available in adequate supply...
181
As enacted, the SBIC program provided for cooperative public and
private funding. The Small Business Investment Act provided for the
formation of small business investment companies licensed by the SBA and
chartered by the states' 2 with no less than ten investors and a minimum of
certain "statutory capital."' 8 3 Each SBIC was authorized to make long-term
loans for a maximum duration and interest set by the SBA, or to buy debt
instruments convertible into stock from small business firms. To facilitate
this program, the government provided federal capital to SBICs in the form
of loans or debt instruments granted through the SBA. Additionally, the
government matched half of the SBICs' paid-in capital through federal loans;
for every dollar put up by private investors for an SBIC, the government put
up twice that amount. Is4 For example, the Small Business Investment Act of
1958 required a minimum of $150,000 of private funds invested in an SBIC
before it could receive a license. While an SBIC was required to have
$300,000 of total initial capital, the private investors could start the company
with only $150,000, receive another $150,000 from the SBA by issuing
debentures, and another $150,000 from the SBA through special loans.
Therefore, for every dollar private investors provided, the government
matched two dollars of the minimum capital needed. 185 In addition, investors
in SBICs enjoyed generous tax concessions from the government that were
meant to encourage their participation in small business investment. 86
181. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, § 102, 72 Stat. 689.
182. Id. § 301, 72 Stat. at 691.
183. Id. § 302, 72 Stat. at 692.
184. Id. §§ 301-03, 72 Stat. at 691-93.
185. Id.; see also Burt Schorr, Spotlight on SBICs: SBA Summoning Operators of
Many Firms As Prelude to Possible Disciplinary Steps, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1967, at 28. For
the amendments made to the Small Business Investment Act, see PARRIS, supra note 10, at
157-60; SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
90TH CONG., INVESTIGATION INTO SMALL Bus. INV. COMPANIES 4 (Comm. Print 1968). At
some times, the government provided $3 dollars per $1 of private investment. Full Committee
Hearing on Increasing Investment in Our Nation 's Small Businesses Before the H. Comm. on
Small Bus., 1 10th Cong. 53 (2007) (statement of Stephen Vivian, Nat'l Ass'n of Small Bus.
Inv. Companies).
186. For example, Congress granted SBIC investors ordinary loss treatment instead of
the limited capital loss treatment, a 100% dividend deduction received from small businesses,
etc. The SBA acted to expend these tax benefits to SBICs in order to encourage investors. See
SBA Consultant Urges Tax Law Changes To Spur Small Business Investment Firms, WALL ST.
J., May 21, 1959, at 3.
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One of the key innovations of the SBIC program was its ability to make
direct investments in the equity of small business.' 87 Up to that point, SBA
activity focused on guaranteeing loans and not engaging in equity financing,
a task that required greater supervision and human resources the SBA did not
have. The novel change in this position came through the SBIC program,
which added private capital to the equation and involved investors that took
charge of these tasks.' 88 Yet the SBIC soon proved that combining
government programs with private market capitalism is not necessarily a
recipe for a successful business plan and the SBIC Participating Securities
program was eliminated. 89
V. LOCKED IN AN INEFFECTIVE PATH
As soon as Congress created the SBIC program, the numbers of
participants grew rapidly. Nevertheless, their performance was
underwhelming.
[T]he record of the SBIC industry after a decade is far from impressive.
Indeed, one could well question whether the whole exercise is worth the
effort.
Profits have been meager by any yardstick. It was not until the year
ending March 31, 1967, that the SBIC industry ever showed an over-all
profit .... 190
187. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, § 304, 72 Stat. 689,
693.
188. "Whenever a company provides capital to a small-business concern under this
section, such concern shall be required to become a stockholder-proprietor of the company by
investing in the capital stock of the company, in an amount equal to not less than 2 percent nor
more than 5 percent of the amount of the capital so provided, in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Administrator." Id. § 304(d), 72 Stat. at 693.
189. See, supra note 22. See also, Joseph W. Bartlett, Government-Enhanced Equity
Available for Investment in Traditional Venture Capital and Buyouts: The New SBIC
Participating Securities Program, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 589, 612-15 (1994) (SBIC
participating securities program is inefficient in closing the small business equity gap).
190. PARRIS, supra note 10, at 160. See also Elizabeth M. Fowler, S.B.J.C. Program
Has Growth Pains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1966, at 155 ("232 of the S.B.I.C.'s could be called
'problems.' Some have never gotten started investing; some have heavy losses; some have
violated S.B.A. regulations.").
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A. Early Problems of the SBIC Program
From its inception, the success of the SBIC program was questionable.
Critics of the SBIC program argued that it simply threw "cheap money" at
small business. 91 Although the Small Business Committees reported that
SBICs were prosperous and successful, 192 their contribution to narrowing the
equity gap was minor and controversial. 93 The number of new SBICs shot
up soon after the program was established, but soon began to fluctuate, and
after about 25 years interest in the program waned. By the early 1980s, the
number of SBICs opting out of the program, voluntarily or via liquidation,
generally exceeded the number of new licenses. As a result, the number of
SBICs since the mid 1980s has been decreasing.' 94 One of the reasons for
this phenomenon is that investors in SBICs were not aware of what they
were getting into; they were enticed by the idea of tax incentives and the
privilege of borrowing from the government without fully assessing the
effects of risky investments, declining stock markets, and heavy compliance
costs. 195
191. Small Business and Big Government, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1960, at 16 (arguing
politicians hawked "'cheap' money and bigger Government.").
192. H.R. REP. 87-2569, at 45 (1963). ("During the 87th Congress small business
investment companies have achieved substantial growth in numbers, the number of dollars
available from this source for investment purposes, and in public acceptance.").
193. See, e.g., supra note 204 and accompanying text.
194. Some of the figures are also attributed to mergers as well that SBICs experienced
at that time. See, e.g., Takeover Targets: New Bosses Liquidate Some SBICs, Switch
Investments of Others, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1967, at 1.
195. Shaky SBIC's: New Investment Firms Hobbled by Stock Drop, Government Red
Tape, WALL ST. J., Jul. 16, 1962, at I ("Within the next five years, half of the 600 companies
now in the program probably won't be around.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Sanford
L. Jacobs, Firms Find Harsh Provisions In Hazardous-Waste Statutes, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 12,
1983.
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Figure 1- SBIC License Activity 1960-1997
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Stories about misuse of government money and violations of SBA
regulations began to appear in the press. Some SBICs voluntarily
surrendered their licenses, liquidated, or merged because of lack of
profitability. 96 In 1966, the Senate Banking and Currency Subcommittee on
Small Business held hearings and reported that the number of SBICs in
financial trouble increased sharply as the program progressed. 97 That year,
the Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations conducted hearings
regarding failures of federally insured banks and revealed similar abusive
practices in the SBIC context. Consequently, closer investigation of the
SBIC companies and their operations revealed the following problems with
the SBIC program and its SBA supervision.'
98
196. This was mainly due to low profitability. See Mid-States Business, A Small-
Business Firm, Proposes to Liquidate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1964, at 5; Southwestern Capital
Directors Will Attempt To Dissolve Company, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1964, at 10.
197. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T OPERATIONS,
REP. ON INVESTIGATION INTO SMALL Bus. INV. COMPANIES, S. REP. No. 90-958, at 5 (1968)
[hereinafter SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T OPERATIONS REPORT].
198. Id.
2011] SMALL BUSINESS: THE CHIEF BUSINESS OF CONGRESS 41
1. Human Capital Problems
In the early days of the program, individual investors often sought to
make a fast profit.' 99 Yet they acted without the proper knowledge of how to
manage small businesses successfully and did not comprehend the unique
problems facing small concerns. 20 In most cases, the SBA encouraged the
formation of new SBICs by generously granting licenses with few limitations
and inadequate supervision. 20 1 The SBA carried out little or no investigation
into the individuals requesting SBIC licenses - failing to examine their
character, reputation, business experience and qualifications to make prudent
20)2loans - so fraudsters began taking advantage of the program. Despite
efforts to improve the standards for granting new licenses, the SBA did not
have an adequate independent examination mechanism for the SBIC
203program.
The SBICs' boards of directors were the most important element in the
SBICs' valuation processes of small business portfolio securities. Therefore,
managing the risk each SBIC took upon itself was largely a mutual decision
of its board of directors. Accordingly, their knowledge, skill, ability, and
integrity were key factors in investment valuations. Further, while obtaining
information, learning processes and procedures and requiring proper
documentation and reporting from the prospective small business firm were
helpful, the portfolio ultimately required management to make a proficient
decision.204 One of the severe weaknesses of SBICs throughout their history
199. In February 1966, for the first time, the SBA began to require prior approval to
any change in control or ownership of an SBIC. ld at 8. (testimony of Bernard Boutin,
Administrator of the Small Business Administration).
200. Id.
201. See Small Business Administration Preparing Loan-Guaranty Plan for
Investment Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1964, at 9 (discussing how in its attempts to spur loans
to small business and in light of its own reserves' depletion, the SBA proposed a loan-
guaranty plan for SBICs that would require it to put aside less money for reserves).
202. See Spotlight on SBICs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1967, at 28 ("[Tlhe rising number
of court actions against SBICs being initiated by the Justice Department in the SBA's behalf
to recover Government funds. At year-end, over 60 such cases were pending in court, triple
the number of a year earlier .... Collectively, the companies named so far as defendants owe
Uncle Sam approximately $22 million.").
203. See generally Review of Small Business Administration's Programs and Policies,
1969: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong. 1 (1969); see also SBIC
Chief Calls 232 of the 700 Companies 'Problem'Firms, Warns of $18 Million Loss, WALL ST.
J., June 15, 1966, at 2.
204. In the 1990s hearings of the Committees, the valuation process was identified as a
severe weakness in the SBIC program. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T
OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 197, at 10-11. See also S. REP. No. 102-44 (1991), at 35-37.
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was the ineffectiveness of this human factor, which was in charge of making
the subjective final valuation decision, but did not have direct expertise and
the skill set unique to managing small business concerns.
20 5
Lack of managerial expertise and lack of proper guidance from the SBA
were some of the main reasons for the program's failure.20 6 SBICs did not
possess and were not offered sufficient knowledge about the types of
businesses they sought to support. While some SBICs provided consulting
services to small firms for a small fee, 20 7 due to their limited resources, they
could not afford the appropriate staff needed to supervise investments. Many
managers of SBICs soon discovered that small businesses became high credit




a. Poor Risk Management
It is no secret that investments in small businesses are more precarious
than those in large ones. Consequently, aside from systemic risks associated
with external conditions such as national and regional economic and
financial cycles, SBICs are exposed to greater risks due to their focus on
small business ventures. 20 9 Most of these transactions involve venture capital
205. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T OPERATIONS REPORT,
supra note 197, at 45 ("Conflicts of interest and self-dealing transactions, including
'bootstrapping' and 'cross-dealing', were prevalent in the program.").
206. Roger W. Benedict, Shaky SBIC's: New Investment Firms Hobbled by Stock
Drop, Government Red Tape, WALL ST. J., Jul. 16, 1962, at I ("[M]any persons in the SBIC's
got into the business for the wrong reasons and with the wrong abilities .... The 'irresistible'
lure of the special tax advantages and the Government loans at reasonable terms brought many
into the industry.") (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Burt Schorr, Spotlight on
SBICs: SBA Summoning Operators of Many Firms as Prelude to Possible Disciplinary Steps,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1967, at 28 ("'This program [SBIC] was oversold,' says an SBA official
overseeing the cleanup drive. 'Too many SBIC operators looked on it as a way to make a fast
buck."').
207. The SBA initiated a plan aimed at encouraging up to five SBICs to hire central
management and share office space with other SBICs hoping their work together would lead
to their merger. See SBIC Chief Calls 232 of the 700 Companies 'Problem' Firms, Warns of
$18 Million Loss, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1966, at 2.
208. Id.
209. See generally Elijah Brewer III et. al., A Trojan Horse or the Golden Fleece?
Small Business Investment Companies and Government Guarantees (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chicago, Working Paper No. 22, 1997), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digitalassets
/publications/workingpapers/1997/wp97 22.pdf.
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- that is, primary risk capital provided to small firms in their early and
difficult formative periods.
210
Furthermore, the constricted profit potential of many SBICs contributed
to their failures. After granting a long-term loan to a small business, SBIC's
only source of income was the spread between the interest the SBIC had to
pay to the SBA and the interest and the fees the SBIC collected from its
211loans or the capital gains it realized on its investments, if any. Yet the
SBIC also had high costs to cover. Aside from the interest the SBIC owed on
government loans, it usually incurred expenses such as rent, utilities, travel,
salaries, and investigating and consulting costs on new loans and
investments. 212 If any profit remained after deducting those costs and
absorbing any losses incurred on failed investments, the SBIC had to
distribute dividends to its stockholders, who were looking to recover their
investments.21 3 As a result, many SBICs' executives chose to funnel their
low-cost federal money into high-return real estate ventures - a practice the
214SBA did not restrict.
Shortly after its establishment, the SBIC program seemed to be
providing most loans to large, publicly held investment companies.
215
Ironically, because of the large sunken costs, SBICs preferred to invest in
midsize firms. 216 The relative profitability of the SBIC program was due only
to the shift away from lending to small business and toward larger loans to
bigger businesses, contrary to the program's objective.217 This trend shut the
210. S. REP. No. 102-44, at 14 (1991).
211. ld. at 4-6.
212. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Slocum, Rise of the SBIC's: Federally-Aided Units Triple in
Number, Pool Funds for Bigger Loans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1961, at I (discussing the large
legal fees and investment SBIC has to expense for every loan it administers, which makes it
less profitable to loan to small business and more to medium businesses).
213. Id.
214. Burt Schorr, Spotlight on SBIC's: SBA Summoning Operators of Many Firms as
Prelude to Possible Disciplinary Steps, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1967, at 28.
215. Id. (citing Walter B. Stults, staff director of the Senate's Select Committee on
Small Business, which conducted a constant study of how the program is functioning.) See
also Burt Schorr, Takeover Targets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1967, at 1.
216. Halt Urged in Adding New Small Business Investment Concerns, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 10, 1961, at 4 ("[S]mall business investment corporation is gravitating more and more
toward big and speculative ventures.").
217. George Melloan, Rise of the SBICs Federally-Aided Unites Set Up to Lend to
Small Business, Expand Fast- more Sell Stock to Public: Critics Say Some Aid Only Fast-
Growing Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1960, at I ("The entrance of big, publicly held
S.B.I.C.'s into the field . . . is leading to the shift away from very small borrowers toward
bigger companies that have prospects for growth to a size where their securities will qualify
for listing on stock markets or be actively traded over the counter.").
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door on the same people Congress was trying to help. Eventually, the
program recuperated from its stagnate state when banks were authorized to
form small business investment subsidiaries.
218
b. Deficiencies in the SBA's Monitoring of SBICs
During the 1960s, the SBA faced serious repayment problems and the
SBIC program was called into question.219 One Wall Street Journal staff
reporter wrote:
When the Government set out to solve the capital problems of small
businessmen, its intention may have been excellent.., its achievements
are nonetheless dismal .... As the sorry saga of the SBICs shows once
more, however, the interests of the nation are usually served best if all
other avenues are explored first before turning over yet another task to
fumbling Federal fingers.220
The Small Business Investment Act of 1958 imposed on the SBA a duty
to supervise and regulate the SBIC program.22 1 Assuming that responsibility,
however, proved to be difficult. The SBA was blamed for its failure to
administer the SBIC program and prevent the increasing numbers of SBIC
failures or their delay in providing new loans.22 2 For the program's first eight
years, the SBA made no effort to determine the basic factors necessary for
the profitable operation of SBICs.223
One reason for this malfunction was that the SBA was not equipped with
the knowledge or expertise to supervise and manager investment companies.
The SBA's accounting system and financial records, which did not provide
218. See Marine Midland Seeks to Form Small Business Investment Company, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 25, 1960, at 15; Melloan, supra note 217, at 1. For bank-owned SBIC today see,
infra note 269 and accompanying text.
219. Burt Schorr, Antipoverty Setback, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1967, at 1. In 1967, it was
estimated that the Government might lose about $10 million on defaulted loans. It turned a
blaming finger to the SBA for making poor choices of borrowers and inadequate counseling
and supervision of those businesses. Id.
220. A Fumbling Mr. Fix-it, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1967, at 14.
221. The Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 633 (1958).
222. A Fumbling Mr. Fix-it, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1967, at 14 ("A number of the
SBICs reacted by making no loans at all, eventually just going out of business. Others plunged
right ahead and, not surprisingly, wound up with a raft of financial trouble."). See also Mr.
Boutin 's Battle, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1967, at 18 ("Of the 434 SBICs examined by the SBA,
only 38 showed no violations of the agency's regulations, and 28 were put under review to
decide ifa full investigation was needed.").
223. STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T OPERATIONS, 90TH CONG.,
REP. ON INVESTIGATION INTO SMALL Bus. INV. Co. 45 (1968).
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accurate, complete, or current information on the SBICs' performance.224 As
a result, the SBA failed to inform itself about the status of its loans to SBICs
or the expected government losses. 225 The SBA was not able to make
effective and timely evaluations of SBICs until they reached an "impairment
of capital" status,226 a point when improving the financial conditions of those
companies was virtually impossible.227
SBA standards and procedures to govern the licensing of new SBICs and
changes in control of existing companies were inadequate. 8 Individuals
were not regularly required to report on investments they purportedly made
and as a result, undesirable and unqualified individuals entered the
program. 229 Furthermore, the SBA did not set proper monitoring mechanisms
and often made additional advances of government funds to troubled SBICs
230without a reasonable prospect to repay.
The responsibilities of the SBA's investigatory staff exceeded its
resources. Overload on the SBA's Office of the Inspector General was a big
part of why the SBA was impaired in investigating SBICs. 23 1 While
investigating the SBIC program, the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations
and Government Operations reported that the examinations and
investigations of SBICs by the SBA to detect conflicts of interest and other
violations were inadequate. There was no program for regularly scheduled,
routine examinations, and when examinations were made, considerable time
elapsed between them. Consequently, when fraud, conflicts of interest, and
224. Id. at 12, 18, 45.
225. For example, in its 1966 report to Congress, the SBA estimated that 232 out of
699 SBICs were in trouble and that $18 million of Government funds advanced to these 232
companies would be lost. Id. However, Bernard Boutin, who was appointed Administrator in
May of 1966 rejected this figure and estimated loss to a total of over $50 million. Id. Later, the
SBA increased its reserve for losses to $54.1 million as of March 31, 1967. Id. at 46
226. This status is defined by.the SBA regulation as a loss of 50% or more of the
privately invested capital, which increases the risk of the government losing all its funds. Id. at
9.
227. Id. at 14.
228. See SBJC Chief Calls 232 of the 700 Companies 'Problem' Finns, Warns of $18
Million Loss, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1966, at 2.
229. Id. (noting that the SBA's administration and supervision of the SBIC program by
the SBA was "lax" and inefficient).
230. Id.
231. COMM. ON SMALL Bus., THE SMALL Bus. ADMIN.'S SMALL Bus. INV. CO.
PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. No. 102-44, at 47 (1991) ("During the
decade of the 1980s, the compliance examination program for SBICs was subjected to
considerable impairment .... The SBA . . . suffered such impairments by the simultaneous
increase in its responsibilities, and the curtailment or withholding of resources available to
perform its mandated functions.").
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mismanagement were found, the SBA's actions to protect the government's
funds and help the SBICs' management were weak, indecisive, and
ineffective, and were limited to correspondence and conferences with the
232SBICs' managers.
233
The SBA also had problems enforcing its regulations. SBA rules did
not expressly prohibit or penalize conflicts of interest within a SBIC
operation, and in fact, they allowed self-dealing and cross-dealing
transactions as long as they were reported to the SBA.234 And even when
violations existed, the SBA's enforcement was practically non-existent,
mostly because there were no penalties set for violating the agency's
regulations.235
At the end of the 1960s, the SBA tried to assume responsibility and
began to investigate violations of its regulations.236 The SBA took
disciplinary action against several executives of SBICs, 237 and tightened its
licensing standard for new SBICs. 238 Yet, the SBA soon loosened its
232. Review of Small Business Administration's Programs and Policies-1969,
Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong. (1969); S. SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T OPERATIONS, 90TH CONG., REP. ON INVESTIGATION INTO SMALL
Bus. INv. Co. 45 (1968).
233. Deputy Administrator for the SBIC program, Richard E. Kelley, reported that
when he took over the position, the SBA's examination program collapsed and 75% of all
companies were never examined at that time. Id. at 19.
234. The phrase "self-dealing" refers to interlocking dealings between those who grant
the money and those who get it. "A majority of the nation's 600-plus SBICs apparently still
avoid self-dealing." Double Standard, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1963, at 1; see also Mr. Boutin's
Battle, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1967, at 18. For the first decade of its operation, the SBA officials
believed existing SBA regulations were adequate to control conflicts of interest. S. SUBCOMM.
ON INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T OPERATIONS, 90TH CONG., REP. ON INVESTIGATION INTO SMALL
Bus. INv. Co. 10-11 (1968).
235. For example, the Comptroller General of the U.S. reported to the Senate, "A
primary basis for selecting an SBIC for examination was apparently its proximity to one of the
SBA field offices." Id. at 14.
236. Id. at 49 (In 1966, "Mr. Boutin further reported that he feels the SBIC program as
it now stands is unworkable; that it needs a completely new approach or it will deteriorate
further from an already shaky position.").
237. Drive to Police Small Business Investment Firms Is Successful, Federal Aides
Say, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 3, 1962, at 4. The SBA also proposed rules to halt investors who were
looking to buy out publicly held SBICs below liquidation value by refusing to allow such
liquidation if during the preceding year a "major change" had occurred in the board of
directors or in parties controlling 10% or more of its stock. SBA Aims to Spur Mergers, Curb
'Raiding' of Small Business Investment Companies, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1964, at 4.
238. For example, in 1964, the SBA had ordered a 90-day freeze on its licensing of
SBICs and announced stricter standards would be laid down in the fall because many SBICs
were part-time operations that were just sitting still and were not performing the role Congress
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239supervision to avoid discouraging SBIC investment activity.
Congressional actions to provide the SBA with greater enforcement authority
were not enough to keep the SBIC program on track.240 Almost yearly, the
SBA's Office of the Inspector General continues to report deficiencies in the
241SBA's own oversight of the SBIC program in its annual report.
B. SBICs Today
During the last half century, the SBIC program has widely been
242considered faulty. At many points, SBICs were at a crossroads, when their
intended to SBICs. The SBA was also worried that more than half of the 717 SBICs were
clustered in just six states. See U.S. Orders Halt to New SBICs For the Next 90 Days, WALL
ST. J., July 6, 1964, at 2; see also Small Business Agency Fights Parts of Senate Investment
Firm Bill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1961, at 3. The SBA required SBICs to have a full time
responsible officer with five years investment banking experience, maintain an office
accessible to the public, maintain a minimum of private capital, and banned family
relationships between stockholders. SBIC Licensing Standards Made More Stringent, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 16, 1964, at 5.
239. Small Business Administration to Propose Stiffer Curbs on Conflict-of-Interest
Loans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1964, at 2 ("Generally, officials say the agency's current policy is
to liberalize regulations governing the investment companies' day-to-day operations where
possible, in order to minimize Government interference."). Deputy Administrator James
Parris, who authorized SBIC self-deals, commented, "Our main concern is securing capital for
small businesses. We don't want to bog small SBICs down with too many regulations."
Double Standard, WALL ST. J., July 2, 1963, at 1; see also Eric Wentworth, SBA Studies
Proposals Aimed at Improving Profit of Small Business Investment Firms, WALL ST. J., Nov.
17, 1964, at 10; Burt Schorr, Spotlight on SBICs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1967, at 28 (noting that
the big problem confronting the SBA is "[d]evising regulations tight enough to protect the
taxpayer's $275 million investment in these companies without crippling their ability to
finance risky small business enterprises, the role Congress intended").
240. Bill for Tighter SBIC Rules, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1966, at 3. ("A bill to tighten
Government regulation of small business investment companies was approved by a Senate
banking subcommittee" giving the SBA "power to revoke SBICs licenses after administrative
proceedings[,] . . . power to remove or suspend [SBICs] officers and directors" for issuing
cease-and-desist orders against individuals and SBICs that had violated regulations, and
authorizing the SBA to "fine or order one-year imprisonment if officers or directors of the
firms use their stock in an SBIC as collateral for a loan to buy additional stock in the same
company.").
241. Dilger & Gonzales, supra note 49, at 21 (For example, in 2003, the SBA's OIG
indicated, "an ongoing audit of SBIC oversight indicate[d] that policies and procedures in the
Investment Division do not limit financial risk.").
242. COMM. ON SMALL Bus., THE SMALL Bus. ADMIN.'S SMALL Bus. INV. CO.
PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. No. 102-44, at 47 (1991) ("The SBIC
program is in a free fall of crisis proportions leading to extinction if immediate and effective
changes aren't made to its basis structure .... This crisis is the result of a combination of
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ineffectiveness spurred public debate and raised questions about their
24persistence.  Yet, the criticism has been systematically channeled toward
ways to improve the program, rather than abolish it.244 Support for the
program from the SBA and the congressional small business committees
largely made this possible. While cognizant of the constant problems of the
program, those agents continually stressed the importance of the program
and offered ways for its improvement.245 For example, while stressing the
fact that the number of financing each year offered by SBICs has been
increasingly declining,24 the SBA in its report to the government proposed
placing several regulatory limitations on the SBIC but continue its
247operations.
When enacting the Small Business Investment Act in 1958, Congress
sought "to provide an additional source of capital funds to small business
concerns" envisioning "the establishment of a new industry composed of a
privately owned corporations, which would stimulate and supplement the
flow of equity capital and long-term loans to such small business
concerns. '248 Today, it is clear that thus far the SBIC program has not been
effective in narrowing small business equity gap, which largely remains in
factors generally classified as deterioration in the asset quality of SBICs caused by factors
both internal and external to the SBICs and what is a faulty basic program incentive
structure.").
243. Id.
244. See id. at 5 ("The SBIC program is at strategic crossroads in its history. Currently
there are regulatory and legislative proposals that would make major changes to the structure
and operations of the program. Most of these proposals are a response to problems that have
been identified during oversight hearings held during 1990 by the U.S. Senate's Committee on
Small Business..."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-3854 (2009); H.R. Rep. No. 111-5554, at 9
(2010); Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240. All of these reports address
various SBIC-related issues and the CRS report that discusses the SBA's recommendation to
improve the SBIC program. Dilger & Gonzales, supra note 49.
245. See COMM. ON SMALL Bus., THE SMALL Bus. ADMIN.'S SMALL BuS. INV. CO.
PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. No. 102-44, at 5 (1991); see also Small
Business Committee Review the Problems of the SBIC Program yet Stressing its Significance:
Hearing on Increasing Investment in Our Nation 's Small Businesses Before H. Comm. on
Small Bus., 110th Cong. (2007).
246. COMM. ON SMALL Bus., THE SMALL Bus. ADMIN.'S SMALL Bus. INV. CO.
PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. No. 102-44, at 11 (1991) ("the trend in the
number of financings made each year by standards SBICs and SSBICS has been steadily
falling.")
247. Id. at 88.
248. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C.S. § 633 (1958); see also
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND GOV'T OPERATIONS, 90TH CONG., REP. ON
INVESTIGATION INTO SMALL Bus. INV. Co. 45 (1968).
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effect.249 A study analyzing the SBIC program's profitability between 1986
and 1991 characterized this period as one of very low profitability and very
high failure rates that generated significant losses for the federal
government. 250 This study held that there was a "negative relationship
between the extent to which SBICs used government-guaranteed funds and
their economic performance" over the examined period.2 51
Currently, the SBIC program is very small and has been declining,
providing an insignificant number of new financing to small business. 2 At
present, figure 2 demonstrates SBICs continue to be liquidated at a rapid
pace, exposing the SBA to a higher risk per company. Others are choosing to
exit from the program voluntarily.
253
249. See Katherine Ryder, The Wrong Fix for Small Business Lending, FORTUNE, July
20, 2010, available at http://money.cnn.com/2010O7/20/news/economy/small-business_
lending.fortune; Catherine Clifford, Small Biz Lending Stimulus Runs Dry-again,
CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 22, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/22/smallbusiness/sba_
recovery loanqueue; Catherine Clifford, SBA Lending Slips as Stimulus Cash Dries Up,
CNNMoNEY.COM (July 9, 2010) http://money.cnn.com/2OlO/07/02/smallbusiness/
smallbusiness sba loans/index.htm; Emily Maltby, Small Business Lending Drops 57%,
CNNMONEY.CoM (Apr. 3, 2009) http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/02/smallbusiness/smallbiz_
loansdrop.smb/; Catherine Clifford, Small Biz Lending Freefall in Spotlight,
CNNMONEY.COM (Nov. 18, 2009) http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/17/smallbusiness/small_
business forumgeithner-sba/; Brian Krumm, Understanding the New Tennessee Small
Business Investment Company Credit Act: Stimulating Economic Growth At the Intersection
of Free Market Capitalism and Government Intervention, I 1 TRANSACTIONS 93 (2010).
250. For example, of 280 SBICs sampled in 1986, 89 entered liquidation by the end of
1993 and 67 surrendered their licenses, leaving 123, or well under half, of the original sample.
Elijah Brewer Ill, Hesna Genay, William E. Jackson III, & Paula R. Worthington, A Trojan
Horse or the Golden Fleece? Small Business Investment Companies and Government
Guarantees (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial
Regulation, Paper No. WP-97-22), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digitalassets
/publications/workingpapers/1997/wp97 22.pdf; see also Senate Small Business Committee
Report, supra note 235, at 17 ("By the end of 1991, almost 40$ of the outstanding SBA
leverage of the SBIC program was in a liquidation status ... In 1991, SBICs of under $5.0
million of assets are leaving the program rapidly with a drop of 45% during the past five
years.").
251. Brewer III, supra note 250, at 23.
252. In FY201 1, there were 299 licensed SBICs in operation (143 debenture SBICs, 97
participating securities SBICs, 46 bank-owned/non-leveraged SBICs, and 13 SSBICs). The
number of licensed SBICs has declined since FY2006: there were 369 licensed SBICs in
FY2007, 348 in FY2008, 315 in FY2009, and 307 in FY2010. In FY20ll, 203 SBICs
provided at least one new financing to small business. See, Robert Jay Dilger, Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, SBA Small Business Investment Company Program 12
(Feb. 2, 2012).
253. For example, in 2007, the SBA issued 9 new SBIC licenses and the number of
SBIC licenses surrendered or transferred to liquidation Was 28. id.
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254
Over the last half century, instead of narrowing the equity gap of small
business funding, the growing demand for funding has increased.255 The
funding ratio offered to small business concerns has decreased, with SBICs
serving less than 0.2 percent of the small business population, a figure that
256has been dropping each year. There are many small businesses stillstruggling to find financing for their needs. When financing is found, the
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Edward C. Burks, Patman Presses Inquiry on Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1969 (quoting Congressman Wright Patman, then Chairman of the House Currency and
Budget Committee, as saying on the House floor that "[i]t is no secret that lately the Small
Business Administration has fallen far short of the goals and ideals under which it was
established.., the agency is without funds to make loans to small businessmen").
256. In fact, "[t]he number of financings being provided to small business concerns
fell almost 30% between 1989 and 1990." COMM. ON SMALL Bus., THE SMALL Bus. ADMIN.'S
SMALL Bus. INV. CO. PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. No. 102-44, at 65
(1991). Between 1984 and 1990, the number of standard SBIC financings had been cut in half
from about 2800 to 1300. Id. at 25. That number remained the same in 2004, when the SBIC
program approved 192 loans out of total of 89,681 loan guarantees to small businesses. See
SMALL Bus. ADMIN., REPORT OF APPROVED LOANS BY PROGRAM (2010), available at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/WDSApprovalCountReport.pdf. However, in
2009, the SBIC program provided less than 0.1% by approving 35 loans to small business out
of 47,916 total loans. Id.
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terms available are most often unsuitable to the needs of the small business
concerns, and thus, many small firms settle for short-term loans or none at
all.257 Recently, Representative Nydia Veldzquez emphasized in different
occasions on the House floor the current high demand for an institutional
source of long-term loan and equity capital for small businesses: 8
In previous recessions, the SBA has filled the gaps in private capital
markets. Today, that is not the case. Loans funded by the SBA's
flagship program have seen double digit declines, meaning, when we
need the SBA to step in an help lift the capital markets, they are actually
doing less.
259
Credit standards are stricter, and small businesses are now looking not
only to loans and to credit cards to finance their operations, but they are
also looking to equity investment to turn their ideas into reality. This
has become even more pronounced as asset values have declined,
leaving entrepreneurs with less collateral to borrow against.
260
Today, the inefficient path of the SBIC program continues. 261 Since its
enactment in 1958, the Small Business Investment Act has undergone
257. See, e.g., COMM. ON SMALL Bus., THE SMALL Bus. ADMIN.'S SMALL Bus. INV. CO.
PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. No. 102-44, at 16 (1991). It is impossible to
compare the number of small business loan applications rejected despite repeated attempts of
the author to obtain this data from the SBA.
258. Generally, the number of loans granted by all SBA programs has been decreasing
in the last five years. See id. For example, from a peak of 277,292 loans provided by all SBA
programs in 2006, the number decreased to 124,360 in 2007, 93,541 in 2008, 69,765 in 2009
and 70,236 in 2010. Id.
259. Statement of Representative Nydia Velazquez, Committee Hearing on Laying the
Groundwork For Economic Recovery: Expanding Small Business Access to Capital, Hearing
Before the House Committee on Small Business, 111 th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 1 (Jun. 10, 2009).
260. Representative Nydia Velazquez, Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2010,
House Debate, 156 Cong. Rec. Daily, H4516 (June 16, 2010).
261. At some point, in addition to the "regular" SBICs licensed under section 301(c) of
the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Congress added a new type of Specialized Small
Business Investment Company (SSBIC) meant to provide financing to small businesses whose
"participation in the free enterprise system is hampered because of social or economic
disadvantage." 26 U.S.C. § 301(d) (2006); see also Dilger & Gonzales, supra note 49, at 2.
Yet, SSBICs were repealed at the end of the 1990s due to scandals that involved wealthy
individuals using the SSBICs for private investments that did not involve minorities. See, e.g.,
The Whitewater Scandal at Whitewater: A Primer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1993, at A10 (noting
that no new SSBIC licenses had been issued since October 1, 1996). The SBA's 8(a) Business
Development Program replaced the SSBIC and continued to support and closely supervise
business development for small and disadvantaged businesses. 13 C.F.R. §124 (2009); see
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numerous revisions, almost one in each congressional session.262 This is
largely because of the support for the SBIC program from both the Select
Small Business Committees and the SBA as a means of improving the well-
being of small businesses, even when faced with reports of the inefficiency
of the program.263 For instance, the SBA continues to provide positive
feedback by calling for the liberalization of the SBIC program.
264
Accordingly, the SBA promotes parallel liberalization plans in other
organizations and agencies. On many occasions, the Small Business
Committees proposed easing the compliance and tax burden on SBICs as a
way to increase the flow of capital to small businesses from SBICs. 265 At
other times, the committees have urged Congress to grant small businesses
also COMM. ON SMALL Bus., 104th Cong., PROPOSALS TO STRENGTHEN THE SBIC PROGRAM
(1995).
262. See generally,LExIS search of Small Business Amendment Act of 1958, which
provides for over 30 amendments to the act between 1970 and 2010.
263. For example, during the late 1980s the House and Senate Small Business Select
committees promoted a proposal that expanded the long-term credit assistance for SBICs in
the form of the proposed Corporation for Small Business Investment Charter Act (COSBI).
Corp. for Small Business Investment Charter Act, H.R. 3392, 100th Cong. (1988); Corp. for
Small Business Investment Charter Act, S. 2686, 98thKCong. (1984). Yet, lack of conclusive
empirical data on the economic effects of federal credit assistance as well as political ideology
postponed the launch of this proposed entity. JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
RL NUMBER, PROPOSED CoRP.FOR SMALL BUS. INV. CHARTER ACT, PRO-CON
ANALYSIS (1984). In 1994, the SBA established the SBIC Participating Securities Program
(SBIC PSP) to encourage equity investments in the early stage of small business. Yet, in
response to extensive losses and criticism over the SBIC program, in 2004 the SBA decided to
close down the SBIC PCP program but kept and advocated for increased federal funding for
the Debenture part of the SBIC program. See Private Equity for Small Firms: The Importance
of the Participating Securities Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 109th
Cong. 5 (2005).
264. See, e.g., Legislation Updating and Improving the SBA 's Investment and Surety
Bond Programs: Full Committee Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 1
(2007) (noting that the SBA reported on the SBIC program's problems and proposed to
modify and simplify certain rules for the program).
265. Small business committees were instrumental in promoting legislation in
Congress that eased the tax burden on small businesses and encouraged investment in these
concerns. See, e.g., Greater Federal Aid to Small Bus. Urged by House Unit, WALL ST. J., Jan.
10, 1963, at 13. Proposals to Strengthen the SBIC Program: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Small Bus., 104th Cong. 1 (1995) ("Within the SBIC program, specialized SBICs licensed to
make investments only in minority-owned businesses have proven excessively costly to
taxpayers for a variety of reasons, some relating to the program's structure and some relating
to the business practices of certain SSBICs."); The Impact of New Market Tax Credits, the
SBIC Program, and 504 Program on Urban Communities: Full Comm. Field Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. (2007).
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and SBICs more funding, and to consider legislation to encourage small
business investments.266
Moreover, banking institutions, which used to play a significant role in
the SBIC program, are rapidly leaving it. The era of big bank-owned and
operated SBICs is over. 267 Until the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
in 1999, the only way a bank could operate a venture capital or private equity
fund was by obtaining an SBIC license. 268 Therefore, banks were key
partners of SBIC program and had a significant positive impact on the
performance of the program. For example, in the 1990s bank-owned SBICs
provided 61% of the total loans and investments, 74% of the total cash and
idle funds, and 75% of the disbursements to small concerns. 26 9 However,
with the passage of the act, banks are now permitted to operate private equity
subsidiaries without obtaining and maintaining SBIC licenses. As a result,
currently, only 15% of all SBICs are bank-owned and less than 5% of dollars
now invested by all SBICs is attributable to bank-owned and operated
SBICs.270
After half a century, it seems we are locked in in a program that does not
fulfill its mission of closing the lending gap to small and pioneering firms.
But our legal system is filled with rules and regulations governing small
businesses, and so we remain invested in an inefficient path; seemingly
remaking it would involve high negative externalities.27' In the meantime,
266. See, e.g., Senate Unit Asks Change in Small Business Investment Program to
Make It a Success, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1960, at 6; Increasing Investment in our Nation's
Small Businesses: Full Comm. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. II-
28 (2007) (statement of Stephen Vivian, National Association of Small Business Investment
Companies); Legislation Updating and Improving the SBA's Investment and Surety Bond
Programs: Full Comm. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. (2007).
267. Increasing Investment in our Nation's Small Businesses: Full Comm. Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 51 (2007) (statement of Stephen Vivian,
National Association of Small Business Investment Companies).
268. Id.
269. COMM. ON SMALL Bus., THE SMALL Bus. ADMIN.'S SMALL Bus. INV. CO.
PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. NO. 102-44, at 8, 17 (1991). Additionally,
due to the high regulatory supervision on such financial institutions, the risk of bank-owned
SBICs failures remained lower than non-Bank owned SBICs.
270. Dilger & Gonzales, supra note 49, at 10.
271. For a similar notion, see, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Should Small Businesses Be
Tax-Favored?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 387 (1995) (asserting generally it is difficult to construct a
case in favor of systematically favoring small businesses, especially through the tax code);
Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The Political Influence of American Small Business,
37 S. TEX. L. REv. 15, 28 (1996) (estimating that the cost of annually subsidizing small
business is $5 billion); Eric Toder, Does the Federal Income Tax Favor Small Business?,
NAT'L TAX Assoc. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 100TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 1, 4 (2007),
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the government is continuing to waste time and money sustaining a failed
small business program.
VI. CONCLUSION
The causes of events are ever more interesting than the events
themselves. - Cicero272
Large and small firms have different funding options.273 Because they
are perceived as risky ventures, small firms have trouble obtaining capital to
finance new equipment or to expand inventories.274 While larger firms can
raise capital through retained earnings or issuance of new securities, smaller
firms cannot issue new stock easily and usually do not have much retained
earnings. Congress sought to narrow that gap of small business funding by
establishing loan guarantees and special preferences, such as the SBIC
program.
One of the fundamental conditions to generate social change is critical
thinking about the choices made in the past.275 In the case of government's
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411606 (arguing against the federal income tax favoring
firms of different sizes).
272. MARCUS TULIUS CICERO, EPISTOLAE AD ATnICUM, Book IX, Section 5, in CARL
C. GAITHER & ALMA E. CAVAZOS-GAITHER, STATISTICALLY SPEAKING: A DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 20 (1996).
273. Richard J. Judd & Barbra K. Sanders, Regulation, Small Business, and Economic
Development: A Historical Perspective on Regulation of Business, in RICHARD J. JUDD,
WILLIAM T. GREENWOOD, & FRED W. BECKER, SMALL Bus. IN A REGULATED ECONOMY-
ISSUES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 223 (1990).
274. See, e.g., Relieffor Small Firms Urged by Witnesses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1958, at
9 (discussing the Curtis Bill proposed to expand funding for small business and Congress to
encourage the reinvestment of earned income); Thomas Petzinger, Jr., Closed Doors, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 1980, at 1; Sanford L. Jacobs, Reagan Group Suggests Ending Programs
Favoring Small Firms, WALL ST. J., Jan 12, 1981, at 23.
275. "If a society cannot think effectively about the alternative path because it lacks
the vocabulary, concepts, or even belief that the other path could exist, then that society
cannot consciously choose either to return to the branch point of the two paths (and then go
down the other path) or to jump to the other path." Hathaway, supra note 24, at 651. Stephen
J. Margolis & S.J. Leibowitz, Path Dependence, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW &
ECONOMICS 17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). Yet, scholars have clarified that "path dependence
does not simply mean that history matters, but rather that once an institution has taken a path,
the costs of reversal may be very high, so that earlier plausible options (like the inquisitorial
system) are now excluded." Page, supra note 31, at 87 (criticizing the over-application of the
idea of path dependence to almost any process, which caused this concept to dull in value by
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relations with small businesses, it is useful to look back in history to a
"critical juncture" by which Congress acknowledged the need not only to
protect small concerns from the concentration of economic power but
vigorously promote small businesses.276
Small business culture developed from our nation's philosophy of
separation of powers, one of the bases of our democracy. Throughout
history, suspicions about the concentration of power brought the government
to favor small firms, viewing them as guardians of fair competition and free
society. Natural disasters and economic shocks aggravated the inherent tight
credit problem of small business and reinforced preconceived notions that
small businesses had to be salvaged whenever events out of the government's
control harmed their well-being. This tendency brought government to
expand its patronage over the years by providing small firms with special
preferences through the legal system. Since most minority businesses are
small businesses, their advancement was another form of affirmative
action.277
Once a small business culture developed, corresponding small business
political incumbents expanded path dependency of small business
278programs. Small business agencies and entities were established to
promote another type of growing power-the power of the small business
organizations. Congress formed congressional small business committees
and the SBA to look at small businesses' problems and reduce their equity
gap. Consequently, the SBA provided direct loans and created a unique
partnership between the private and the public sector to provide venture
capital and long-term equity financing-the SBIC program. 279 Yet, the
program soon turned out to be inefficient and cumbersome, and led to losses
for the government and private investors.
Recently, scholars have been arguing that the case for small business
favoritism is ambiguous when one looks at the transaction costs and the
noting that "in becoming a trendy way to say that history matters, path dependence no longer
provides any analytic leverage").
276. CHRISTOPHER DWYER, KNOW YOUR GOVERNMENT-THE SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION 21 (1991).
277. David B. Longbrake & Woodrow W. Nicholas, Jr., A Geographic Structure for
Black Small Business Research, in SMALL BUSINESS IN A REGULATED ECONOMY-ISSUES AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 187 (Richard J. Judd et a]. eds., 1990).
278. Page, supra note 31 at 88.
279. COMM. ON SMALL BUS., THE SMALL BUS. ADMIN.'S SMALL BUS. INV. Co.
PROGRAM: A REVIEW OF SELECTED ISSUES, S. REP. NO. 102-44, at 4 (1991).
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cumulative effects of regulation.280 The experience of the last half decade
shows the SBIC program did not provide benefits exceeding its costs. If one
is to look at the performance of the SBIC program and consider alternative
routes, one might discover a more efficient solution to the equity problem of
small business. Yet, as this paper reveals, Congress's early funding policy
became locked-in and resistant to change through self-reinforcement of
organizations such as the SBA and congressional committees and expansion
of positive feedbacks of growing small business culture.
The question of why our legal system maintained this inefficient
program over a century is important to explore. Likewise, the intuitive
concept that small is beautiful (when it comes to business) needs to be
examined through the prism of social history and the path dependence
paradigm. Rhetoric and the desire of legislators to appeal to their constituents
are over-simplistic explanations for the abundance of small business
preferences. 281 This article aimed at providing a more comprehensive
framework to explain the long-time existence of failed small business
programs. By utilizing path dependence theory in the political prism, the
article proved that self-reinforcing small business organizations and the
development of positive feedbacks through small business culture
contributed to the persistence of an inefficient program such as the SBIC.
Our legal system is locked in an inefficient rut. Congress has invested
extensive resources in the SBIC rut, and created rules and regulations to
encourage others to follow that rut. Although it may seem that the costs of
diverging from the current program seem too high,282 breaking the inefficient
SBIC path can only be achieved by radical reform led by courageous
280. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matters? An Economic Analysis of Small Business
Exemptions From Regulation, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1 (2004) (arguing against
granting special regulatory exemption for small businesses from securities regulations);
WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESS: THEIR ROLE
AND REGULATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986).
281. David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal
Agenda, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2096 (2004) (stating that the new moralizers have
suggested that their budget-busting tax cuts benefit another group widely regarded as suffering
from innocent misfortune: small-business people); see also Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive
Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy,
61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 590 (2008) (arguing that while small business gets lip service
politically, government programs often fail to match the rhetoric); Stacy Sulman Kahana,
Crossing the Border of Plenary Power: The Viability of an Equal Protection Challenge to
Title IVofthe Welfare Law, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1421, 1439 (1997) ("The Court need not accept
Congress' rhetoric as fact.").
282. Page, supra note 31, at 88; Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 645-46 (1996).
[Vol. 43:1
2011] SMALL BUSINESS: THE CHIEF BUSINESS OF CONGRESS 57
legislators.2 3 An alternative to the current SBIC program is to return to the
initial proposal of instituting private local bank lending to increase the supply
of capital available to small businesses. 284 Banks and institutional investors
tend to have specialized knowledge about particular industries and are better
suited to monitor and assist small businesses. And the Federal Reserve
System is much more equipped with supervising, licensing and auditing
capabilities to administer investment. institutions such as SBICs than the
SBA.285 Since the current SBIC experience of combined market capitalism
and government intervention has been unproductive, there is a need to find a
more efficient route such as shifting to private institutional banking system.
The purpose of this article was to spur a rethinking of the road we have
taken in the last century. Policymakers should be aware of the path
dependencies in our legal system and consider whether alternative, different
paths would be more efficient and effective. 286 Our government is constantly
considering proposals to simplify the legal system.28 7 The SBIC is an
example of a small business program that has not fulfilled its purpose and
should be replaced or at least redesigned to better achieve its goals. It is also
time to rethink the focus on size in the U.S. legal system and the contribution
of small business to the economy as it is not certain that the goose has indeed
288laid the promised golden eggs.
283. Due to the high political value of small business, no one would like to be viewed
as going against the "little guy" or the "Main Streets across America". See, Press Release,
U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship, supra note 3 (statement of
Sen. Patty Murray (D-WA)).
284. See supra notes 187-191 and accompanying texts.
285. Id.
286. Pierce, supra note 50, at 563.
287. For example, in March 2009, the Obama Administration announced the formation
of a task force led by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker as part of the
President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board. The task force was charged with proposing
ways to simplify the tax code, reduce evasion, close loopholes and reduce the tax gap. How
the Complexity of the Tax Code Hinders Small Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Small Bus.
Subcommittee on Finance and Tax (2009) (testimony of Keith Hall, National Tax Advisor).
The task force received more than 500 submissions of serious tax reform ideas and decided to
delay its report and hold various public meetings. Statement from PERAB Chairman Paul
Volcker on Tax Task Force (November 27, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.govblog/2009/11/27/perab-tax-task-force.
288. See generally Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-sizing the "Little Guy" Myth in Legal
Definitions, 98 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that small business definitions are
inconsistent, overinclusive, and do not fulfill their legislative intent).

